Com. v. Walsh, M.
Com. v. Walsh, M. No. 961 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Apr 21, 2017Background:
- Postal inspection and drug-dog alert on a package addressed to Matthew Walsh led to federal search warrant and discovery of several pounds of marijuana.
- An anticipatory warrant and controlled delivery to Walsh’s residence followed; Walsh was observed carrying the package, arrested, and additional marijuana and literature found in the home.
- Walsh made incriminating statements admitting knowledge of the drugs and their value.
- Walsh pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea to one count of PWID on December 16, 2015 and was sentenced to 36 months intermediate punishment; he did not file a direct appeal.
- Walsh filed a PCRA petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) based on counsel telling him he had “no chance” at trial, failing to tell him his driver’s license would be suspended, and misexplaining sentencing; the PCRA court denied relief and the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Walsh's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for advising Walsh he had “no chance” at trial, rendering plea unknowing | Counsel told Walsh he had no chance, so plea was involuntary; counsel failed to adequately discuss trial risks | Counsel reasonably evaluated facts (incriminating statements, additional marijuana) and concluded trial success was unlikely; advice was within competent range | Denied — counsel’s view that trial success was unlikely was reasonable and not constitutionally deficient |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to advise that plea would suspend Walsh’s driver’s license | Walsh says he was not warned of license suspension and would not have pled if warned | License suspension is a statutorily mandated collateral civil consequence; counsel need not advise on collateral consequences | Denied — suspension is collateral consequence; counsel not required to advise |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to explain sentencing exposure correctly | Walsh claims counsel misexplained potential sentence, affecting voluntariness | Record shows Walsh was informed of maximum and standard-range exposure in plea colloquy and discussed plea agreement | Denied — court found Walsh was informed of possible sentence and failed to prove prejudice |
| Whether PCRA standard and prejudice burden applied correctly | Walsh argued different proof standard | Commonwealth and courts applied preponderance standard and Hill/Strickland prejudice test (would have gone to trial) | Denied — preponderance standard and demonstrable prejudice requirement applied and unmet |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (Prejudice in plea context requires showing defendant would have gone to trial)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (Counsel’s failure to communicate plea offer and prejudice analysis in guilty-plea context)
- Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343 (Counsel not ineffective for failing to advise on collateral consequences)
- Commonwealth v. Duffey, 639 A.2d 1174 (Driver-license suspension is a collateral civil consequence)
- Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795 (Standards for proving IAC under the PCRA)