COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Ian M. DUFFEY, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
April 8, 1994
639 A.2d 1174
Argued Sept. 22, 1993.
Lester G. Nauhaus, Public Defender and Shelley Stark, Chief-Appellate Div., Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
OPINION
MONTEMURO, Justice.
Appellant, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT), appeals from an order of the Commonwealth Court, reversing an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissing appellee Ian Duffey‘s appeal from a 90 day suspension of his driving privileges. Duffey‘s license was suspended pursuant to
The sole question presented for our review is whether the suspension required under
On June 7, 1990, Duffey was cited for possession and consumption of an alcoholic beverage while being less than 21 years of age, a violation of
Upon receipt of this notice, appellee filed a timely statutory appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. On November 21, 1990, at a de novo hearing, appellee, represented by a public defender, filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to the underage drinking charge contending that it had been unknowingly and unintelligently entered because appellee was without knowledge or notice of the consequence of the license suspension. The court denied appellee‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and dismissed his appeal on the basis that the challenge constituted an impermissible collateral attack of the underlying conviction which could not be accomplished in a civil proceeding.
Appellee filed a notice of appeal in the Superior Court. On May 7, 1991, the Superior Court granted DOT‘s motion to transfer the case to the Commonwealth Court. On April 13, 1992, the Commonwealth Court issued an order and opinion
We have held that a defendant‘s lack of knowledge of the collateral consequences of pleading guilty does not undermine the validity of his guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555 A.2d 92 (1989). See also United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 177 (3rd Cir.1988) (deportation a collateral consequence of pleading guilty). We have also recognized that the collateral consequences of pleading guilty are “numerous“. Frometa, 520 Pa. at 555, 555 A.2d at 93. A sampling of collateral consequences for pleading guilty includes: loss of the right to vote,
Today, we hold that loss of driving privileges is a civil collateral consequence of a conviction for underage drinking under
As we hold that appellee‘s suspension is a collateral civil consequence of his conviction, there is no requirement that he know of this consequence at the time of his guilty plea. Appellee‘s loss of driving privileges is “irrelevant to the determination of whether a guilty plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly.” Frometa, 520 Pa. at 555, 555 A.2d at 93.
Appellee contends that the suspension of his driving privilege is not a civil collateral consequence, but a criminal penalty. We find these arguments unpersuasive. Appellee first argues that his suspension is a criminal penalty because the statute mandating the suspension,
Appellee next argues that the operating privilege sanction cannot be a collateral civil consequence because it is ordered by the court. A consequence is civil in nature where, “imposition has been vested in an administrative agency over which the criminal judge had no control and for which he had no responsibility.” Brewster v. Department of Transportation, 94 Pa.Commw. 277, 280, 503 A.2d 497, 498 (1986). See also Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.1974); Commonwealth v. Wellington, 305 Pa.Super. 24, 451 A.2d 223, 224 (1982). Under this test, we find that the appellee‘s suspension was a collateral civil consequence. We recognize that
As we hold that the suspension of operating privileges pursuant to
We would suggest to our legislature that it should be clearly stated on the citation, if it is not already, that a guilty plea to the offense of underage drinking will result in a license suspension. While we hold today that a licensee does not have to be warned of the collateral consequences of license suspension, we believe it would be more equitable and no great burden on the Commonwealth to provide such a warning.
In view of our holding, it is clear that operating privilege suspensions imposed by the Department of Transportation under
LARSEN, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
FLAHERTY, J., files a dissenting opinion.
MONTEMURO, J., who was an appointed Justice of the Court at the time of argument, participated in the decision of this case in his capacity as a Senior Justice.
FLAHERTY, Justice, dissenting.
The majority adds the loss of driving privileges to other “collateral consequences” of a conviction, the lack of knowledge of which will not undermine the validity of a guilty plea, yet the very magistrate before whom the plea was entered signed the order directing the suspension of the defendant‘s operators license, albeit in the performance of a mandatory function. In my view this direct involvement by the sentencing authority in what is termed a “collateral consequence” makes a significant difference, particularly where one is precluded from driving, indeed a severe sanction, call it what you will, in today‘s world. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.