Com. v. Strum, A.
Com. v. Strum, A. No. 2277 EDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jul 27, 2017Background
- In May 1995 Strum participated in an armed robbery in Philadelphia during which the victim, Robert Malcom, was beaten and shot; Strum later confessed and fled for two years under aliases.
- A jury convicted Strum of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy, and PIC in December 1997; he received life imprisonment plus consecutive and concurrent terms.
- Strum’s direct appeal was affirmed in 1999; he did not seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
- Strum pursued multiple collateral challenges (three prior PCRA petitions and federal habeas filings); those efforts were denied at various levels.
- In October 2015 Strum filed his fourth pro se petition styled as a writ of habeas corpus in state court, alleging the criminal information was fatally defective and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
- The PCRA court treated the filing as a PCRA petition, found it untimely (filed roughly 15 years after the judgment became final), and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Strum’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the criminal information was fatally defective | Strum argued the information omitted essential elements so the court lacked jurisdiction and verdict/sentence are void | The Commonwealth (and PCRA court) treated the filing as a PCRA petition and argued the claim is subject to PCRA timeliness rules and exceptions | The court held the claim is cognizable under the PCRA but the petition was untimely and no exceptions were pleaded; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether the writ-styled petition could avoid the PCRA time-bar | Strum contended titling the filing a habeas petition removes it from PCRA constraints | Commonwealth maintained that collateral claims encompassed by the PCRA cannot escape its exclusivity simply by label | The court held that claims cognizable under the PCRA must be brought under the PCRA and cannot evade timeliness by relabeling |
| Whether any timeliness exceptions applied (e.g., jurisdictional defect fits an exception) | Strum implied that a jurisdictional defect removes waiver/timeliness barriers | Commonwealth noted the three statutory exceptions and that Strum did not allege or prove any exception within 60 days | The court found no allegation or proof of any § 9545(b)(1) exception and ruled it lacked jurisdiction to reach merits |
| Whether the Superior Court could reach merits despite untimeliness | Strum implicitly asked for relief on substance of defect claim | Commonwealth argued jurisdictional time limits prevent merits review | The court held it lacked authority to address substantive merits due to jurisdictional time bar; affirmed dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001) (claims cognizable under the PCRA must be brought under the PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1999) (PCRA is the sole means for state collateral relief)
- Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011) (post‑sentence petitions filed after judgment is final are treated as PCRA petitions)
- Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013) (burden is on petitioner to plead and prove a timeliness exception)
- Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (jurisdictional time limits affect court’s competency to adjudicate PCRA petitions)