Com. v. Snook, J.
230 A.3d 438
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2020Background
- On Feb. 17, 2013, Joshua Snook fatally stabbed his grandmother and injured his grandfather; charged with murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy.
- In Mar. 2014 Snook pleaded guilty (third‑degree murder) and nolo contendere to related counts under a plea that, among other things, permitted post‑sentence communication with his wife and recommended 20–60 years; sentence imposed and not appealed.
- Snook filed a 2015 PCRA claiming plea counsel ineffective because a DOC policy made the communication term impossible; PCRA court agreed, vacated the 2014 sentence (Mar. 29, 2016), and Snook pleaded to a new bargain (16–60 years).
- A subsequent challenge to the 2016 colloquy led the court to vacate that sentence (June 15, 2018); Snook entered a new plea, received 12–40 years, and expressly waived appeal and all future PCRA claims; the June 15, 2018 plea also included the Commonwealth’s promise to return certain personal property.
- Snook filed a timely June 11, 2019 PCRA from the June 15, 2018 judgment asserting ineffective assistance and that the Commonwealth breached the plea by failing to return property; the PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely/serial and did not address the breach claim.
- The Superior Court held Snook’s 2019 filing was a timely first PCRA from the June 15, 2018 judgment but affirmed denial because Snook had knowingly waived PCRA relief; the Court vacated and remanded only the unaddressed breach claim concerning return of property as a contractual/specific‑performance matter outside the PCRA.
Issues
| Issue | Snook's Argument | Commonwealth / PCRA Court's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the PCRA court erred in rejecting Snook’s claim that the Commonwealth breached the June 15, 2018 plea agreement by not returning property | The Commonwealth promised return of specified personal property as part of the plea; failure to return is breach and entitles Snook to enforcement | The PCRA court dismissed the filing without addressing the breach, treating the petition as untimely/serial | Vacated and remanded on this issue: breach claim is a contractual plea‑enforcement matter outside the PCRA and merits consideration by the trial court |
| Whether the June 11, 2019 petition was untimely/serial and therefore barred | The petition was a timely first PCRA from the June 15, 2018 judgment (filed within one year) | The court treated it as a serial petition tied to the original 2014 judgment and dismissed as untimely | Superior Court held the June 11, 2019 petition was timely as a first PCRA from the June 15, 2018 judgment, but waiver bars relief on PCRA claims |
| Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to appoint PCRA counsel and hold an evidentiary hearing | Snook argued he was entitled to counsel and a hearing to develop ineffective‑assistance and fact disputes | PCRA court did not appoint counsel or hold a hearing and denied petition as untimely | Court affirmed denial on waiver grounds and found appointment/hearing unnecessary here because waiver precluded PCRA relief and an appointment would be futile for those claims |
| Whether plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate intoxication and for deficient colloquy (mens rea for malice) | Counsel failed to investigate intoxication as a defense and did not ensure colloquy addressed mens rea, rendering pleas unknowing | Commonwealth/PCRA court viewed these claims as cognizable under the PCRA but precluded by Snook’s express waiver of PCRA rights in the June 15, 2018 plea | Waiver forecloses consideration of these PCRA ineffective‑assistance claims; denial of PCRA relief affirmed on that basis |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998) (PCRA is the exclusive vehicle for collateral relief and encompasses cognizable claims)
- Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001) (claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under the PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220 A.3d 607 (Pa. Super. 2019) (plea‑agreement enforcement is contractual and may be litigated outside PCRA via specific performance)
- Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, 136 A.3d 99 (Pa. Super. 2016) (parties’ reasonable understanding controls in plea‑breach disputes; specific performance may be ordered)
- Commonwealth v. Martinez, 147 A.3d 517 (Pa. 2016) (convicted defendant is entitled to specific performance of plea terms that are part of the bargain)
- Commonwealth v. Byrne, 833 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. 2003) (defendant may knowingly waive appellate or PCRA rights as part of plea bargaining)
- Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163 (Pa. Super. 1996) (upholding waiver of post‑trial rights as part of plea exchange)
- Commonwealth v. Reese, 31 A.3d 708 (Pa. Super. 2011) (appellate court may affirm trial court on any correct basis)
- Commonwealth v. Hart, 911 A.2d 939 (Pa. Super. 2006) (failure to appoint counsel for a first PCRA petition can be harmless where appointment would be futile)
- Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 701 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1997) (no evidentiary hearing required when no genuine issue of material fact and no relief is available)