230 A.3d 438
Pa. Super. Ct.2020Background
- In Feb. 2013 Snook fatally stabbed his grandmother and injured his grandfather; he and his wife were charged.
- March 2014: Snook entered a plea (third-degree murder; nolo for aggravated assault & conspiracy) with a negotiated 20–60 year recommendation and a term permitting post‑sentence communication with his wife; sentence imposed April 2014. No direct appeal.
- April 2015–March 2016: First PCRA alleged plea counsel ineffective because the plea included an unenforceable promise (communication with co‑defendant). PCRA court agreed, vacated the 2014 sentence, and Snook entered a new plea (16–60 years) on March 29, 2016.
- June 2018: PCRA relief again granted as to the 2016 plea colloquy; Snook entered a new plea and received 12–40 years. As part of that plea Snook expressly waived his right to appeal and to future PCRA claims, and the Commonwealth agreed to return specified personal property after the 30‑day appeal period.
- June 11, 2019: Snook filed a pro se PCRA petition from the June 15, 2018 judgment alleging ineffective assistance and that the Commonwealth breached the plea agreement by not returning his property. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as an untimely serial petition; Snook appealed.
- Superior Court held the June 11, 2019 petition was timely as the first petition from the June 15, 2018 judgment, but concluded Snook’s express waiver of PCRA rights bars his ineffective‑assistance claims. The Court vacated and remanded only Snook’s breach‑of‑plea claim (return of property) for enforcement (contractual) proceedings outside the PCRA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / serial PCRA | Snook: petition is first, timely PCRA from June 15, 2018 judgment | Commonwealth/PCRA court: filing is a serial, untimely petition from original 2014 judgment | Held: Petition is timely as first PCRA from the June 15, 2018 judgment |
| Validity/effect of waiver of PCRA/appeal rights | Snook: PCRA claims should be considered | Commonwealth: Snook expressly waived PCRA and appeal rights in 2018 plea | Held: Waiver was knowing/voluntary; it bars Snook’s PCRA ineffective‑assistance claims |
| Breach of plea agreement (failure to return property) | Snook: Commonwealth failed to return personal property, breaching explicit plea term | Commonwealth/PCRA court: treated petition as untimely and did not address breach | Held: Claim is a contractual plea‑enforcement matter outside PCRA; remanded for enforcement proceedings |
| Appointment of counsel / evidentiary hearing | Snook: court erred by not appointing PCRA counsel and holding an evidentiary hearing | Commonwealth: denial appropriate given waiver and/or futility | Held: No remand for counsel or hearing on PCRA claims (waiver made relief unavailable); appointment/hearing would be futile as to PCRA claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998) (PCRA is the exclusive vehicle for collateral relief raising PCRA‑cognizable issues)
- Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001) (claims cognizable under the PCRA must be brought under the PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220 A.3d 607 (Pa.Super. 2019) (petition to enforce a plea agreement is treated outside the PCRA as contractual enforcement)
- Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, 136 A.3d 99 (Pa.Super. 2016) (courts demand strict compliance with plea agreements; terms interpreted objectively)
- Commonwealth v. Martinez, 147 A.3d 517 (Pa. 2016) (defendant entitled to specific performance of valid plea‑agreement terms)
- Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163 (Pa.Super. 1996) (defendant may waive rights in plea bargains if knowing/voluntary)
- Commonwealth v. Byrne, 833 A.2d 729 (Pa.Super. 2003) (express, knowing, voluntary waiver of statutory rights is enforceable)
- Commonwealth v. Reese, 31 A.3d 708 (Pa.Super. 2011) (appellate court may affirm trial court on any correct basis)
- Commonwealth v. Hart, 911 A.2d 939 (Pa.Super. 2006) (appointment of counsel unnecessary where it would be futile)
- Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 701 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1997) (no evidentiary hearing required when no genuine issue of material fact)