Com. v. Rutter, M.
1995 MDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Oct 23, 2017Background
- In December 2014, 16-year-old Marcus Rutter and an accomplice burglarized a home; the 32-year-old victim was sexually assaulted, beaten, stabbed, strangled, and died.
- Rutter was charged with first‑degree murder and numerous related offenses; he pled open guilty on July 11, 2016, to first‑degree murder and other counts in exchange for withdrawal of certain charges and the Commonwealth’s agreement not to seek life without parole; sentences were to run consecutively.
- On July 29, 2016, the trial court sentenced Rutter to 35–70 years for murder plus consecutive terms on other counts, yielding an aggregate 54–109 year term.
- Rutter filed post‑sentence motions challenging the sentence as a de facto life term (no meaningful opportunity for release), a breach of the plea agreement, and as violating Miller and related juvenile‑sentencing law; the trial court denied relief.
- The Superior Court held that the 35‑year minimum for murder complied with 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(a)(1) and the plea agreement, but the 70‑year maximum for murder had no statutory basis and was illegal.
- The Superior Court vacated the judgment of sentence in full and remanded for resentencing, instructing that the murder sentence comply with § 1102.1(a)(1) and Pennsylvania precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether aggregate consecutive terms produce a de facto life sentence for a juvenile that violates the Eighth Amendment | Rutter: aggregate 54–109 years gives no meaningful parole opportunity and is illegal under Miller and the Eighth Amendment | Commonwealth/Trial Court: murder minimum (35 years) is lawful under § 1102.1; aggregate length from consecutive terms is discretionary, not a Miller violation | Court: 35‑year minimum for murder lawful and consistent with plea; aggregate consecutive terms challenge is a discretionary‑sentencing issue, not a legality problem under Miller |
| 2. Whether the sentence violated the plea agreement by resulting in a de facto life term | Rutter: plea promise not to seek life without parole was effectively breached because aggregate sentence functionally equals life | Commonwealth: plea permitted the court to accept or reject; agreement was not to seek LWOP and court imposed lawful minimums; consecutive sentences were part of the plea | Court: Plea agreement honored as to murder minimum and non‑pursuit of LWOP; consecutive terms were part of agreement and within sentencing discretion |
| 3. Whether the trial court failed to apply Miller/Batts youth‑factor analysis properly | Rutter: court made unsupported factual findings and shifted burden; failed to properly weigh youth characteristics and capacity for rehabilitation | Commonwealth: court considered factors and sentenced to the minimum statutory term for juvenile murder; alleged errors relate to discretionary aspects | Court: Because the murder minimum complied with statute, the court declined to overturn on Miller grounds here; did not fully resolve discretionary Miller‑factor sufficiency because remand was required for sentencing defect |
| 4. Whether any portion of the murder sentence was illegal | Rutter: aggregate sentence is effectively illegal as de facto LWOP; asked relief | Commonwealth: minimum 35 years lawful; maximum 70 years for murder lacks statutory authorization | Court: The 70‑year maximum for the murder count is unauthorized under § 1102.1(a)(1) (max must be life); illegal sentence identified sua sponte; vacated sentence and remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; sentencing courts must account for youth characteristics)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for crimes committed by juveniles)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (enumeration of juvenile‑sentencing factors to be considered post‑Miller)
- Commonwealth v. Martinez, 141 A.3d 485 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unauthorized sentences are illegal and correctable)
- Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (court may raise and review illegal sentence sua sponte)