Com. v. Rivera-Figueroa, A., 174 A.3d 674

Appellant Angel Luis Rivera-Figueroa pled guilty in 2002 to sexual/offense-related charges and was sentenced; he was subject to a 10-year Megan’s Law II reporting requirement.
Megan’s Law III (effective 2005) and later SORNA (effective Dec. 20, 2012) expanded registration requirements and applied retroactively to those with outstanding reporting obligations.
Appellant was charged in Dec. 2012 (docket 866-2013) under Megan’s Law III for failing to register; after Neiman (declaring Megan’s Law III unconstitutional), the Commonwealth later amended the information to charge under Megan’s Law II and subsequently charged him under SORNA (docket 1126-2014).
Appellant entered a global negotiated guilty plea in Nov. 2014 to failure-to-register counts on both dockets and received an aggregate sentence in Dec. 2014; no direct appeal was filed.
Appellant filed a counseled PCRA petition (2015) challenging counsel’s effectiveness regarding the sentences; the PCRA court denied relief in Feb. 2017, and Appellant appealed.
While the appeal was pending, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Muniz (July 2017), holding SORNA unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clauses; the Superior Court vacated and remanded to allow Appellant to amend his PCRA petition to raise a Muniz claim.

Issue	Appellant's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether plea counsel was ineffective for failing to withdraw/contest the sentence under docket 866-2013, thereby affecting the global plea and aggregate sentence	Counsel should have withdrawn the unconstitutional sentence at docket 866, which would have yielded a lesser overall sentence	The Commonwealth maintained that Appellant could be charged under Megan’s Law II and/or SORNA and that plea was valid	Superior Court vacated the PCRA denial and remanded to permit Appellant to amend his petition to assert a Muniz claim; did not resolve ineffective-assistance merits
Whether SORNA-based registration convictions/sentences apply retroactively	Appellant argues retroactive application of SORNA is unconstitutional and renders his conviction/sentence invalid	Commonwealth argued pre-existing registration statutes or amended informations supported the charges	Superior Court recognized Muniz (holding SORNA unconstitutional) announces a substantive rule that must be given retroactive effect in collateral proceedings

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (SORNA is punitive and cannot be applied retroactively under the Ex Post Facto Clauses)
Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013) (Megan’s Law III declared unconstitutional)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (U.S. 2016) (new substantive rules of constitutional law apply retroactively in collateral proceedings)
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders; example of a substantive rule applied retroactively)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (framework limiting retroactive application of new rules in collateral review)
Commonwealth v. Secreti, 134 A.3d 77 (Pa. Super. 2016) (discusses distinction between substantive and procedural rules for retroactivity)
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (U.S. 2013) (fact-finding that increases mandatory minimum must be submitted to jury)