Com. v. Pittman, K.
Com. v. Pittman, K. No. 996 MDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Mar 10, 2017Background
- Kermit T. Pittman was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and robbery for a 2011 homicide; he received a mandatory life sentence for first‑degree murder and a concurrent five‑year sentence for robbery.
- Pittman’s direct appeal was denied by the Superior Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal; his judgment of sentence became final July 8, 2014.
- On March 4, 2016, Pittman filed a pro se PCRA petition raising constitutional challenges to his life sentence as a juvenile; counsel was later appointed and filed a Turner/Finley letter.
- The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss; Pittman responded, but the court dismissed the petition on May 11, 2016 and allowed counsel to withdraw.
- Pittman appealed the PCRA dismissal, arguing Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual), Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, and due process violations based on his juvenile status and absence of individualized sentencing considerations.
- The Superior Court reviewed the appeal and affirmed, holding the PCRA petition untimely and that no statutory timeliness exception was pleaded or proven; record shows Pittman was over eighteen at the time of the offense.
Issues
| Issue | Pittman’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eighth Amendment: mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates proportionality/cruel and unusual punishment | Mandatory life for juveniles is unconstitutional absent individualized sentencing considerations | Petition is time‑barred; Pittman was over 18, so Miller does not apply as a basis for a timeliness exception | PCRA petition untimely; claim not within exceptions; dismissal affirmed |
| Equal Protection: classification of Pittman as juvenile under PA Constitution invalidates sentence | Article V §16(q)(ii) defines Pittman as juvenile, triggering equal protection protection against mandatory life | Time‑bar prevents review; no timely exception pleaded or proven | Dismissed as untimely; merits not reached |
| Due Process: entitlement to Eighth Amendment protections via Due Process when sentenced as juvenile without individualized consideration | Due process requires application of Miller protections and individualized sentencing for juveniles | Petition untimely; Miller does not create a retroactive right applicable here for someone over 18 at offense | Petition untimely; court affirmed dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) (procedural standard for counsel withdrawal in post‑conviction representation)
- Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (procedural standard for counsel withdrawal when no merit in PCRA claims)
- Ragan v. Commonwealth, 923 A.2d 1169 (Pa. 2007) (standard of review for PCRA dismissals)
- Brown v. Commonwealth, 48 A.3d 1275 (Pa. Super. 2012) (deference to PCRA court findings)
- Anderson v. Commonwealth, 995 A.2d 1184 (Pa. Super. 2010) (PCRA review principles)
- Bennett v. Commonwealth, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (PCRA timeliness jurisdictional rule)
- Gamboa‑Taylor v. Commonwealth, 753 A.2d 780 (Pa. 2000) (60‑day rule for invoking PCRA exceptions)
- Owens v. Commonwealth, 718 A.2d 330 (Pa. Super. 1998) (finality timing for seeking U.S. Supreme Court review)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa. Super. 2016) (Miller not applicable to offenders over 18 as "technical juveniles")