Com. v. Oakes, D.
Com. v. Oakes, D. No. 2927 EDA 2016
Pa. Super. Ct.Apr 18, 2017Background
- Appellant David Scott Oakes entered an open guilty plea to two counts of aggravated assault and related misdemeanors and was sentenced on September 4, 2012 to an aggregate term of 3 years 8 months to 10 years. No post-sentence motion or direct appeal was filed.
- On May 9, 2016 (over three years after his judgment became final), Oakes filed a pro se "Motion to Modify Sentence Nunc Pro Tunc," treated by the court as his first PCRA petition.
- Appointed PCRA counsel filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter and petition to withdraw; the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss the petition as untimely.
- Oakes filed a pro se response; the PCRA court dismissed the petition on August 10, 2016 as untimely and allowed counsel to withdraw.
- Oakes’ core claim: plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file, or to inform him about, a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence (and that this ineffectiveness should excuse the PCRA time bar).
- The PCRA court concluded Oakes did not plead or prove any statutory timeliness exception and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction; the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the PCRA petition is timely or whether a statutory exception applies | Oakes: counsel’s failure to file or inform him of a reconsideration motion is ineffective assistance that prevented timely filing and should excuse the time bar | Commonwealth: Petition was filed more than one year after finality and Oakes failed to plead any statutory exception; defense counsel is not a "government official" for the interference exception | Held: Petition untimely; Oakes failed to satisfy any §9545(b)(1) exception and did not file within 60 days of discovering any claim; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by plea counsel constitutes a newly discovered fact under §9545(b)(1)(ii) | Oakes: prior counsel’s ineffectiveness prevented him from knowing to file earlier | Commonwealth: Counsel’s ineffectiveness is not a "newly discovered fact" under existing precedent | Held: IAC is not a newly discovered fact; exception not satisfied |
| Whether counsel’s failure counts as "governmental interference" under §9545(b)(1)(i) | Oakes: counsel’s conduct functionally interfered with his ability to present claims | Commonwealth: §9545(b)(4) expressly excludes defense counsel from "government officials" | Held: Governmental-interference exception unavailable because defense counsel is not a government official |
| Whether any newly recognized constitutional right applies retroactively under §9545(b)(1)(iii) | Oakes: argued general due-process/notice concerns but asserted no newly recognized retroactive constitutional right | Commonwealth: No new retroactive constitutional rule implicated | Held: No §9545(b)(1)(iii) basis; exception not met |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277 (Pa. 2016) (standard of review for PCRA denials)
- Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245 (Pa. 2013) (PCRA court’s factual and legal determinations review standard)
- Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2016) (PCRA time restrictions are jurisdictional)
- Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215 (Pa. 2007) (jurisdictional nature of PCRA timeliness)
- Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780 (Pa. 2000) (attorney ineffectiveness is not a "newly discovered fact" for timeliness exception)
- Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) (procedures for counsel’s request to withdraw when filing no-merit letter)
- Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc) (no-merit letter withdrawal framework)