Com. v. Moye, D.
1924 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Sep 29, 2017Background
- Appellant Deauntay Dontaz Moye (age 16 at the time) pleaded guilty to criminal homicide and multiple related offenses; trial court sentenced him to life without parole on December 2, 2016.
- Moye appealed, arguing the court failed to properly consider his youth and Miller-related factors when imposing life-without-parole.
- The trial court had considered age-related factors under Pennsylvania law (18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(d)(7)) but did not have the benefit of a later Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision clarifying procedures for juvenile LWOP sentences.
- After Moye’s sentencing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued Commonwealth v. Batts (Batts II), imposing additional procedural safeguards and creating a rebuttable presumption against juvenile LWOP; the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation.
- The Superior Court vacated Moye’s LWOP sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with Batts II because the trial court lacked the Batts II safeguards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly considered juvenile status before imposing LWOP | Moye: court failed to give proper weight to his youth, immaturity, and background (Miller factors) | Commonwealth: trial court considered Miller factors and Miller addressed mandatory statutes, not discretionary sentencing like here | Vacated and remanded — trial court must apply Batts II safeguards, including presumption against juvenile LWOP and burden on Commonwealth to prove incapacity to rehabilitate beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Applicability of Miller to discretionary juvenile LWOP sentences | Moye: Miller requires individualized consideration of youth-related characteristics | Commonwealth: Miller addressed mandatory LWOP; post-Miller statute already required consideration of age-related factors | Court relied on Batts II which requires more than statutory consideration — procedural safeguards and presumption apply |
| Burden of proof for imposing juvenile LWOP | Moye: implicit that Commonwealth must prove factors showing permanent incorrigibility | Commonwealth: argued statutory framework sufficed without Miller-style presumption | Under Batts II, Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation to rebut presumption against LWOP |
| Whether resentencing is required | Moye: yes, because sentencing occurred before Batts II clarified procedures | Commonwealth: argued existing record/factors were sufficient | Superior Court vacated sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with Batts II |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory juvenile life without parole violates Eighth Amendment; juveniles have diminished culpability and greater capacity for change)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced substantive rule applicable retroactively)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013) (state-level application requiring consideration of juvenile characteristics)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II — requires procedural safeguards, presumption against juvenile LWOP, and Commonwealth proof beyond a reasonable doubt of incapacity to rehabilitate)