Com. v. Mead, C., Jr., 374 MDA 2022

In June 2012, Clark E. Mead Jr. was convicted by a jury of multiple sexual offenses against his then‑girlfriend’s two minor sons; he was sentenced in September 2012 to 27½–55 years, classified as an SVP, and ordered to register under SORNA.
Direct appeal was affirmed by the Superior Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal, making the judgment final on September 30, 2014.
Mead filed a counseled first PCRA petition (July 1, 2015) raising ineffective‑assistance‑of‑trial‑counsel claims; the PCRA court denied relief and the Superior Court affirmed in 2016 due to waiver from a vague Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Mead filed serial pro se PCRA petitions (second and third); both were dismissed as untimely or procedurally defective, and those dismissals were affirmed on appeal.
Mead filed a fourth pro se PCRA petition on January 18, 2022; the PCRA court dismissed it as untimely and Mead’s later pro se amendment citing Commonwealth v. Bradley was denied.
Mead appealed from the PCRA court’s February 16, 2022 order; the Superior Court affirmed, concluding the petition was untimely and Mead failed to plead a statutory time‑bar exception.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing Mead’s uncounseled (pro se) fourth PCRA petition where Mead invoked "newly discovered facts" via controlling precedent (Bradley) to preserve claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.	Mead: Bradley constitutes newly discovered facts or otherwise allows challenging trial counsel despite untimeliness because it concerns effective PCRA counsel.	PCRA court/Commonwealth: Petition is untimely; Bradley does not create a newly discovered fact nor an after‑recognized constitutional right for this purpose; Mead failed to plead any timeliness exception.	Held: Dismissal affirmed—petition untimely; Bradley does not excuse the time bar and Mead did not plead/prove an exception.
Whether Mead was denied due process by the court’s refusal to provide transcripts and discovery necessary to frame his claims.	Mead: Denial of transcripts/discovery prevented him from properly outlining claims, denying due process.	PCRA court/Commonwealth: Court lacked jurisdiction because petition was untimely; merits (and discovery requests) cannot be reached without a timely petition or pleaded exception.	Held: Claim not reached on the merits; court lacked jurisdiction due to untimeliness, so no due process remedy on this petition.

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021) (addressed right to effective assistance of counsel in a timely first PCRA petition; did not create a new constitutional rule that excuses PCRA time bar)
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171 (Pa. Super. 2015) (explains newly discovered facts timeliness exception and due diligence requirement)
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013) (judicial decisions are not "newly discovered facts" for Section 9545(b)(1)(ii))
Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980 (Pa. 2011) (same principle rejecting judicial decisions as newly discovered facts)
Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. 2007) (court lacks jurisdiction over untimely PCRA petitions without pleaded exceptions)
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649 (Pa. Super. 2013) (timeliness of PCRA petitions is jurisdictional)
Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. 2007) (timeliness exceptions must be pled in the petition and cannot be raised first on appeal)
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 92 A.3d 708 (Pa. 2014) (a petitioner must obtain leave before amending a PCRA petition)