Com. v. Lee, N., 260 A.3d 208

Appellant Nicole Lee pled guilty to DUI — Controlled Substance (75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2)) on Jan 22, 2020; Commonwealth amended the information to allege she was an ARD‑ineligible second offender based on a 2011 juvenile adjudication for DUI under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a).
On June 16, 2020 the trial court imposed probation with a condition of 90 days house arrest/electronic monitoring and a mandatory $1,500 fine; the 90‑day minimum derived from the second‑offender mandatory minimum in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c)(2)(i).
After positive drug tests and admissions of heroin use, the court scheduled a probation revocation hearing; Lee filed a "Motion to Determine Legality of Sentence" on July 16, 2020 challenging the use of her juvenile adjudication as a prior offense.
At the July 20, 2020 revocation hearing the court denied the motion, revoked probation, and resentenced Lee to 90 days to 24 months less one day in county prison.
Lee appealed, arguing (in light of Commonwealth v. Chichkin) that a juvenile adjudication lacks the constitutional protections required to qualify as a "prior offense" for mandatory sentencing enhancements under § 3806.
The Superior Court treated Lee’s motion as a timely first PCRA petition and reviewed de novo whether § 3806 permissibly treats juvenile adjudications as prior offenses and whether that use violates Apprendi/Alleyne principles.

Issue	Lee's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether a juvenile adjudication for DUI can be treated as a “prior offense” under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806 to trigger second‑offender mandatory minimums	A juvenile adjudication lacks certain trial protections (no jury/public trial) and thus—following Chichkin—cannot be used to increase punishment without jury proof beyond a reasonable doubt	Chichkin is limited to ARD (a non‑trial pretrial disposition); juvenile adjudications afford core due process protections (proof beyond a reasonable doubt, counsel, confrontation) and § 3806 unambiguously includes adjudications as "prior offenses"	Affirmed: juvenile adjudication qualifies as a prior offense under § 3806; statute is constitutional under Apprendi/Alleyne because juvenile adjudications provide adequate procedural safeguards and the statute clearly includes them

Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020) (held that counting ARD acceptances as "prior offenses" for DUI sentence enhancement violated due process/Apprendi‑Alleyne)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (any fact that increases mandatory minimum is an element that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing punishment beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, with exception for prior convictions)
Almendarez‑Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (established narrow exception permitting prior convictions to be treated outside jury‑found elements rule)
Commonwealth v. Hale, 128 A.3d 781 (Pa. 2015) (interpreting statute where legislature distinguished adjudications from convictions; courts must respect statutory text)
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 743 A.2d 460 (Pa. Super. 1999) (refused to treat juvenile adjudications as convictions for mandatory enhancement where statutory language confined enhancement to convictions)