Com. v. Kline, J., Sr., 166 A.3d 337

Background

Appellant Jessie L. Kline, Sr. was convicted of one count of violating 35 P.S. § 6018.401(a) (management of hazardous waste) and four counts of unlawful conduct under the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA) after DEP inspections found drums, tens of thousands of tires, and contaminated soil on his property; testing confirmed hazardous materials and Appellant admitted contamination in a statement.
DEP had previously entered Consent Orders and Agreements (COAs) with Appellant requiring removal/cleanup; Appellant repeatedly failed to comply and was held in contempt by the Commonwealth Court.
On September 1, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant under 35 P.S. § 6018.606(f) to the statute’s mandatory minimum: 2–4 years’ imprisonment plus 5 years’ consecutive probation for the Section 401(a) violation; concurrent lesser penalties were imposed on other counts.
Appellant appealed, arguing the mandatory minimum in § 606(f) is unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States because it permits fact-finding at sentencing that increases a mandatory minimum.
The Superior Court reviewed whether § 606(f) is facially invalid under the Newman line (which struck statutes that allowed proof-at-sentencing by preponderance) and whether § 606(f) is unconstitutional as applied to Appellant.

Issues

Issue	Appellant's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether § 6018.606(f)’s mandatory minimum sentence violates Alleyne	§ 606(f) imposes a mandatory minimum triggered by facts decided at sentencing ("or in violation of any order of the department"), so Alleyne requires those facts be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt	§ 606(f) is not a proof-at-sentencing statute like those invalidated in Newman; it does not shift an element to sentencing or allow a preponderance standard	Court held § 606(f) is not facially similar to the Newman/Alleyne-offending statutes and is not facially invalid
Whether the contested clause (“or in violation of any order of the department”) adds an element requiring jury determination	The clause functions as an additional factual trigger decided at sentencing, invoking Alleyne problems	The clause merely identifies conduct already proscribed by § 401(a) (failure to act with DEP authorization or to follow DEP orders) and does not add a new element	Court held the clause does not add a new element and thus does not create Alleyne error
Whether Appellant was actually sentenced under the contested language of § 606(f)	Appellant asserts his mandatory minimum was imposed pursuant to § 606(f)’s contested language	Commonwealth notes the record does not show the court relied on the contested clause separate from the § 401 violation	Court observed Appellant failed to show he was sentenced under the contested language and did not argue sentences under the statute (absent that language) would violate Alleyne
Whether any unconstitutional portion of § 606(f) must be severed or the statute struck entirely	Appellant implied the contested clause is nonseverable as in Newman	Commonwealth argued § 606(f) differs from Newman statutes and severability was not at issue	Court found Appellant did not argue severability and § 606(f) differs from Newman; no basis to strike the statute

Key Cases Cited

Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (mandatory minimum increases must be based on facts submitted to jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact that increases penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to jury)
Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (struck proof-at-sentencing mandatory minimum statute as unconstitutional and non-severable)
Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 (Pa. Super. 2014) (applies Newman to strike similar mandatory-minimum statutes)
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2014) (discusses Alleyne’s application to Pennsylvania sentencing statutes)

Decision: Judgment of sentence affirmed.