Com. v. Hunt, B.
220 A.3d 582
Pa. Super. Ct.2019Background
- Appellant Brian F. Hunt, while authorized to write checks for Bass Pallets LLC, arranged sham transactions with two co-conspirators and shared the proceeds. He pleaded guilty to theft and forgery in February 2018.
- At sentencing the trial court ordered Hunt to pay $37,625 restitution to Bass Pallets under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106; Hunt obtained a modification hearing and appealed the restitution order.
- Hunt argued the pre-amendment definition of “victim” in § 1106 (as informed by the Crime Victims Act) covers only natural persons, so a corporate LLC cannot receive restitution; he relied on Commonwealth v. Veon.
- The General Assembly amended § 1106 on October 24, 2018 to expressly include business entities as victims, but those amendments postdate Hunt’s charged conduct, plea, sentencing, and modification hearing.
- The Superior Court held the pre-amendment definition of “victim” under the CVA is limited to human individuals, declined to apply the 2018 amendments retroactively, vacated the restitution portion of Hunt’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court could order restitution to Bass Pallets LLC under the pre-amendment § 1106 | Bass Pallets qualifies as a victim because the trial court may read the Administrative Code and CVA definitions together or rely on general definitions that include entities | Hunt: § 1106’s reference to the CVA limits “victim/direct victim” to natural persons; Veon holds the term contemplates human victims only | Held: Pre-amendment § 1106 (via CVA) defines “direct victim” as an individual/natural person; corporate entities like an LLC are not covered; restitution illegal and vacated |
| Whether the October 24, 2018 amendments to § 1106 (which include business entities) apply retroactively to allow restitution | Commonwealth: Amendment took effect immediately and could apply because judgment was not final | Hunt: Retroactive application would raise ex post facto problems; statute should not be applied to pre-amendment conduct | Held: Declined retroactive application. Under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1926 and precedents (including Tanner), the pre-amendment statute governs; court avoided ex post facto analysis |
| Whether the trial court properly relied on the Administrative Code’s prior definition along with the CVA to include corporate victims | Trial court: the repealed Administrative Code definition and the CVA can coexist; statutory construction and § 1991 support including entities | Hunt: The CVA (current, operative law) creates the relevant definition and limits victims to individuals; § 1991 distinguishes ‘individual’ (natural person) from corporate ‘person’ | Held: The CVA is the operative definition for § 1106; its “direct victim” concept requires an individual/natural person; the trial court erred in expanding victim to an LLC |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435 (Pa. 2016) (interpreting CVA and concluding statutory “victim” language contemplates human individuals)
- Commonwealth v. Tanner, 205 A.3d 388 (Pa. Super. 2019) (refusing to apply § 1106 amendments retroactively to crimes committed before amendment)
- Commonwealth v. Kinnan, 71 A.3d 983 (Pa. Super. 2013) (restitution is statutory and a court lacks power to order restitution absent express legislative direction)
- Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185 (Pa. 2005) (statutory construction standards; questions of law reviewed de novo)
- Commonwealth v. Harner, 617 A.2d 702 (Pa. 1992) (restitution as punitive component requires strict scrutiny and is a creature of statute)