217 A.3d 873
Pa. Super. Ct.2019Background
- In 1988, when he was 17, Jose E. Hernandez was accused of murdering his father, stepmother, and two younger brothers; bodies were found in the bathtub and Hernandez fled the state.
- Tennessee troopers arrested Hernandez after finding a letter in his car in which he wrote he had killed his family and was proud of it.
- In 1990 a jury convicted Hernandez of four counts of first-degree murder and PIC; he was originally sentenced to life without parole terms.
- After Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, Hernandez sought resentencing under Pennsylvania procedures for juvenile lifers; his 1990 LWOP sentence was vacated in 2018.
- At resentencing on June 27, 2018, the court imposed concurrent 45-years-to-life terms (parole eligibility in his 60s) and no further penalty on PIC; Hernandez appealed.
- The Superior Court affirmed, holding the 45-to-life term was not a de facto LWOP and that a life maximum with a term-of-years minimum and lifetime parole tail comported with Pennsylvania precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 45 years-to-life is a de facto life-without-parole requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of permanent incorrigibility | Hernandez: 45-to-life is effectively LWOP for a juvenile and thus the Commonwealth must prove incorrigibility beyond a reasonable doubt | Commonwealth/Trial Ct.: Sentence provides a meaningful opportunity for release and is not equivalent to LWOP | Held: Not a de facto LWOP under controlling precedent (Bebout/Foust); no beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding required |
| Whether the record showed Hernandez had been rehabilitated so as to preclude a de facto LWOP | Hernandez: He has been rehabilitated during ~30 years in custody, so the term-of-years is unconstitutional here | Commonwealth: No distinguishing facts; sentence falls within precedent permitting such minima | Held: Hernandez failed to show he had no plausible chance to survive to earliest release; sentence upheld |
| Whether imposing a mandatory lifetime parole tail and life maximum violates Miller/Montgomery or the Eighth Amendment | Hernandez: A mandatory lifetime parole tail and life maximum defeat individualized sentencing and are cruel and unusual | Commonwealth: Statutory authority (Section 1102.1/precedent) permits life maximum with a minimum term; Batts, Seskey, Blount support imposition | Held: Mandatory life maximum with minimum term and parole tail is authorized and does not violate Eighth Amendment under Pennsylvania precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (U.S. 2016) (Miller applies retroactively)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (permits life maximum on resentencing and discusses parole tails)
- Commonwealth v. Bebout, 186 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2018) (45-to-life term not de facto LWOP where meaningful opportunity for release exists)
- Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416 (Pa. Super. 2018) (term-of-years that equates to de facto LWOP requires beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding of incorrigibility)
- Commonwealth v. Blount, 207 A.3d 925 (Pa. Super. 2019) (confirms mandatory life maximum with court-determined minimum on resentencing)
- Commonwealth v. Seskey, 170 A.3d 1105 (Pa. Super. 2017) (trial court must impose life maximum when resentencing pre-Miller first-degree murder juvenile)
- Commonwealth v. Olds, 192 A.3d 1188 (Pa. Super. 2018) (life maximums for juveniles on resentencing do not violate the Eighth Amendment)