Com. v. Harkins, R.
Com. v. Harkins, R. No. 66 WDA 2017
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Aug 18, 2017Background
- In 2002 Russell Harkins pleaded guilty to two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), three counts of indecent assault, and one count of corruption of minors; some counts were to be nol-prossed under the plea.
- At the time of the plea, IDSI required lifetime registration under Megan’s Law II; Harkins signed a written colloquy referencing registration but the specific term was left blank.
- Harkins completed parole in 2010 and his sentence expired in 2014. Meanwhile, SORNA was enacted in 2011 and went into effect December 20, 2012; it enhanced registration requirements for Tier III offenses (including IDSI) and purported to apply retroactively to persons who had not completed prior registration periods.
- Harkins filed a pro se motion in 2016 seeking enforcement of his plea agreement and to preclude application of SORNA; the trial court treated the filing as a PCRA petition, appointed counsel, and dismissed the petition without a hearing.
- While this appeal was pending, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Muniz, holding SORNA’s enhanced registration provisions are punitive and that retroactive application violates the Pennsylvania Constitution.
- The Superior Court vacated the PCRA court’s dismissal and remanded for reconsideration in light of Muniz; the panel also noted the trial court erred in treating a plea-enforcement motion as a PCRA petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SORNA’s enhanced registration rules may be applied retroactively to Harkins | Harkins: retroactive application of SORNA’s heightened, punitive requirements violates ex post facto principles and the terms of his plea | Commonwealth: SORNA §9799.13 applies to anyone who had not completed prior registration, so SORNA’s requirements apply to Harkins | Superior Court: In light of Muniz, retroactive application of SORNA’s enhanced registration provisions is unconstitutional; remand for proceedings consistent with Muniz |
| Whether the trial court properly treated Harkins’ plea‑enforcement motion as a PCRA petition | Harkins: sought enforcement of plea agreement under contract principles, not PCRA relief | Commonwealth/trial court: treated filing as a PCRA petition and addressed it under PCRA procedures | Superior Court: trial court erred to treat the plea‑enforcement motion as a PCRA petition (per Partee); matter remanded to reconsider in light of Muniz |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. 2014) (discussing SORNA registration tiers and requirements)
- Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245 (Pa. Super. 2014) (a motion to enforce plea agreement is not a PCRA petition; contract principles apply)