Com. v. Dyson, J.
3124 EDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Dec 1, 2017Background
- In 1992 Joseph Dyson (born Aug. 21, 1974) committed first‑degree murder and related offenses; he was 18 years and 56 days old at the time.
- Dyson pled guilty in 1993, was convicted of first‑degree murder after a degree‑of‑guilt hearing, and was sentenced to mandatory life without parole plus concurrent terms.
- Dyson’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal (2001); the judgment became final on Sept. 10, 2002.
- Dyson filed multiple collateral petitions over the years; the instant (third) PCRA petition was filed March 22, 2016, asserting Miller/Montgomery-based relief and other constitutional claims.
- The Bucks County PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely under the PCRA; the court held Miller does not apply to offenders who were 18 or older at the time of the offense and that habeas relief outside the PCRA was not available.
- The Superior Court affirmed, concluding Dyson failed to plead a timeliness exception and therefore the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dyson) | Defendant's Argument (PCRA/Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Miller/Montgomery to Dyson | Miller/Montgomery’s bar on mandatory LWOP should apply because Dyson was "nearly" under 18 (18 yrs + 56 days) and similarly situated to juveniles; he sought resentencing | Miller/Montgomery protect only those under 18; Dyson was 18 at offense so Miller does not create a retroactive right for him under §9545(b)(1)(iii) | Denied — Miller/Montgomery do not apply to offenders 18 or older; Dyson’s claim fails the timeliness exception |
| Equal protection challenge to mandatory LWOP for someone 56 days older than juveniles | The 1‑day/56‑day difference is arbitrary; equal protection requires extension of Miller protections or relief | No precedent requires extending Miller to those over 18; extension cannot be used to overcome PCRA timeliness limits | Denied — no basis to extend Miller; claim untimely and without merit |
| Due process/access to courts — right to resentencing hearing to present mitigating age‑related factors | Dyson was denied procedural and substantive due process because he could not present mitigating age or background factors to avoid mandatory LWOP | The PCRA is the exclusive remedy for such claims; Dyson’s petition is time‑barred and jurisdictionally defective | Denied — PCRA unavailable due to untimeliness; no separate habeas remedy outside PCRA |
| Timeliness / jurisdiction under the PCRA | Miller/Montgomery create a new constitutional right applied retroactively, so petition is timely under the §9545(b)(1)(iii) exception | Dyson’s judgment became final in 2002; his 2016 petition is untimely and he failed to plead a qualifying exception (judicial decisions are not "new facts") | Denied — petition untimely; Dyson did not prove any §9545 timeliness exception; PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to reach merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for offenders under 18 violates the Eighth Amendment)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review)
- Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (Miller does not extend to offenders 18 or older)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 71 A.3d 1009 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (sentence‑legality claims under Miller are cognizable under the PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980 (Pa. 2011) (judicial decisions are not "new facts" for PCRA timeliness exceptions)
- Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999) (PCRA subsumes other collateral remedies such as habeas corpus)