262 A.3d 609
Pa. Super. Ct.2021Background
- Victim (M.H.) is severely mentally and physically disabled (nonverbal); she lived in a group home (CLA) and was cared for by staff including defendant Andrew Dula, III, who worked overnight shifts.
- On Feb. 3, 2016 a coworker (LaShanda Williams) heard an unusual scream, found Dula over M.H. on the bed with M.H. naked from the waist down and frantic; Dula left the scene and later made inconsistent/odd departures and behaviors.
- Caregivers had previously observed M.H. react negatively to Dula (whines, turning away), and noted Dula frequently changed M.H.’s dry diapers, wore long johns, groomed himself singing “I love you M.,” and spent time in the basement.
- A thumbprint-shaped bruise was observed on M.H.’s thigh the morning after; medical/forensic exams were performed though no definitive physical signs of sexual assault were found.
- Dula later gave a detailed confession to police describing multiple sexual acts with M.H.; he was charged on amended counts, tried by jury, convicted on all counts, and sentenced to an aggregate term of 111–228 months. He appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror #23 implied bias for prior indecent-assault victimization — should be excused for cause | Juror’s prior similar victimization created a close situational relationship requiring presumed prejudice; failure to strike denied Appellant a fair venire and forced use of peremptory | Trial court properly questioned juror; she unequivocally said she could be fair, so no presumption of prejudice and no abuse of discretion | Court affirmed: no error — voir dire showed juror could be impartial under Shinal; trial judge’s observation dispositive |
| Admission of M.H.’s primitive nonverbal sounds/reactions and testimony about bruise (relevance/hearsay/Rule 403) | Sounds and reactions were hearsay or misleading because M.H. lacked testimonial capacity; any probative value was outweighed by prejudice | Caregivers’ testimony was lay observation of M.H.’s physical condition/behavior (nonassertive conduct), relevant circumstantial evidence corroborating other facts; bruise was part of why staff reported incident | Court affirmed: evidence was relevant and non‑hearsay (M.H. made no assertions); probative value outweighed prejudice; admissible as circumstantial proof |
| Admission of testimony about Dula’s odd workplace behavior (long johns, diaper practices, basement activity) — Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 concerns | Such evidence constituted impermissible propensity/bad‑acts evidence or was unfairly prejudicial and required a limiting instruction | Trial court admitted this evidence as contemporaneous, circumstantial and probative (not prior unrelated bad acts), corroborating motive/consciousness of guilt; probative value not outweighed by prejudice | Court affirmed: evidence was admissible as substantive circumstantial evidence (not as 404(b) prior bad acts) and not unduly prejudicial |
| Admission of Dula’s inculpatory statements under corpus delicti rule | Commonwealth failed to prove corpus delicti independent of Dula’s statements, so confession was inadmissible | Circumstantial proof (compromising position, M.H.’s reaction, caregivers’ accounts, bruise, Dula’s behavior) established corpus delicti for indecent contact offenses; closely related crimes exception allowed use of confession on other counts | Court affirmed: corpus delicti proven beyond a preponderance (and to jury beyond reasonable doubt for key counts); statements admissible; convictions supported |
| Detective’s unsolicited statement “we didn’t believe him” and mistrial request | Detective’s opinion on Dula’s credibility invaded the jury’s province; curative instruction insufficient — mistrial required | The comment was a single, unsolicited remark; court sustained objection and immediately instructed jury to disregard; not inherently incurable | Court affirmed denial of mistrial: curative instruction was adequate under the circumstances (distinguished from McClure on facts) |
| Refusal to give jury instruction about M.H.’s testimonial incompetence | Jury should have been instructed that M.H. was legally incompetent to testify so they would not infer M.H. could reliably perceive or communicate about the abuse | The court’s competency ruling applied to calling M.H. as a witness; instructing the jury on competency factors was unnecessary and potentially confusing where M.H. did not testify | Court affirmed: no error — request was inapplicable; jury properly received other witness testimony about observed reactions |
Key Cases Cited
- Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429 (Pa. 2017) (distinguishes presumed bias from demeanor‑based voir dire; trial judge’s observations control)
- Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441 (Pa. Super. 2018) (standard for reviewing evidentiary rulings: abuse of discretion)
- Commonwealth v. Counterman, 719 A.2d 284 (Pa. 1998) (lay witness may testify to observable physical condition/appearance of another)
- Commonwealth v. McClure, 144 A.3d 970 (Pa. Super. 2016) (police testimony opining on defendant credibility can be prejudicial; context matters)
- Commonwealth v. Parker, 104 A.3d 17 (Pa. Super. 2014) (implied assertions may be hearsay when declarant intended an assertion)
- Commonwealth v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 587 (Pa. 2003) (corpus delicti rule requires proof of loss and criminal agency before confession admitted)
- Commonwealth v. McMullen, 681 A.2d 717 (Pa. 1996) (closely related crimes exception permits confession to be used for related counts when corpus delicti shown)