266 A.3d 49
Pa. Super. Ct.2021Background
- In 1994 DeJesus shot Raymond McKinley during an armed robbery; McKinley was paralyzed and died in 1997.
- DeJesus was convicted in 1997 of Second‑Degree Murder, robbery, and firearms offenses and received the statutorily mandated LWOP sentence; direct appeal was previously exhausted.
- In 2016 DeJesus filed a pro se PCRA petition invoking Miller/Montgomery; the PCRA court vacated his sentence and ordered resentencing in June 2017.
- A resentencing hearing was held in December 2017 with competing psychological experts addressing mental health and potential for rehabilitation.
- On January 5, 2018 the trial court resentenced DeJesus to life without parole; his post‑sentence motion was denied and he appealed to the Superior Court.
- On appeal DeJesus argued (1) insufficient evidence to show he is incapable of rehabilitation and (2) LWOP for juvenile second‑degree murderers is unconstitutional; the Superior Court applied Jones and affirmed, finding some claims waived.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DeJesus) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LWOP was illegal because sentencing court lacked sufficient evidence that DeJesus is incapable of rehabilitation | Experts agreed rehabilitation is possible; court erred in concluding incapacity to rehabilitate | Under Jones the Eighth Amendment requires only that sentencer have discretion and consider youth and attendant characteristics; appellate review here is of discretionary aspects and DeJesus failed procedural Rule 2119(f) requirements | Treated as discretionary, not legal, challenge; DeJesus failed to include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement and thus waived review of discretionary sentencing; judgment affirmed |
| Whether LWOP for a juvenile convicted of Second‑Degree Murder (no specific intent to kill) violates Eighth Amendment or Pennsylvania Constitution | Second‑degree murder lacks specific intent to kill, so imposing LWOP on juveniles under that conviction is unconstitutional | Jones does not distinguish between first and second degree; Eighth only requires discretion and consideration of youth; state‑constitutional argument undeveloped | Rejected under federal law (Jones controls); state‑constitutional claim waived for lack of development; equal protection claim waived for failure to raise below; judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment absent consideration of youth and attendant characteristics)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller rule is substantive and retroactive; sentencing courts must reconsider juvenile LWOP sentences)
- Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (Eighth Amendment requires sentencer have discretion and consider youth, but does not require a separate finding of permanent incorrigibility)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (state rule requiring finding of permanent incorrigibility for juvenile LWOP; later abrogated by Jones on federal‑law grounds)