Com. v. Corliss, J., 108 EDA 2017

Background

Justin Corliss was tried (consolidated trials) and convicted in 2016 of multiple sexual offenses involving two victims: his daughter C.C. (born 1999) and R.V., with some offenses dating to the mid-1990s.
Earlier, Corliss was convicted in 1998 of sexual offenses involving another victim, D.B., served prison time, was released in 2008, and later lived with C.C. until 2010.
Charges in 2013 (after C.C.’s report) included IDSI, incest, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, indecent exposure, corruption of minors, endangering the welfare of children, and related counts.
Corliss proceeded through periods of retained counsel, pro se representation, and standby counsel; he was found an SVP and sentenced to lengthy consecutive terms (overall 39–78 years before some reductions).
On appeal Corliss raised five principal claims: (1) statute‑of‑limitations jury instruction/tolling; (2) insufficiency of evidence for IDSI and incest (C.C.); (3) alleged prosecution‑elicited perjury/DNA conflicts and related discovery issues tied to D.B.; (4) trial court misrepresentation of exculpatory DNA (waived); and (5) Brady claim for suppression of exculpatory/impeachment material concerning C.C. and related witnesses.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Statute of limitations/tolling	Commonwealth contends tolling under 42 Pa.C.S. §5552(c)(3) applies for sexual offenses against minors and gave timely written notice of tolling.	Corliss argued several convictions were time‑barred (relied on §5552(a)), and that informations lacked tolling allegations.	Court held tolling statute applies, Commonwealth gave adequate written notice well before trial, so claims fail.
2. Sufficiency of evidence for IDSI and incest (C.C.)	Commonwealth relied on C.C.’s trial testimony describing IDSI and proof of parent‑child relationship; jury instructions covered paternity.	Corliss argued C.C.’s testimony was insufficient for IDSI and that paternity (civil default) didn’t prove incest beyond a reasonable doubt; also argued merger of offenses.	Court held C.C.’s testimony was sufficient for IDSI and incest; jury presumed to follow instructions on paternity; IDSI and incest do not merge for sentencing.
3. Alleged perjury / undisclosed DNA re: D.B.	Corliss argued a post‑trial (2017) DNA report excluded him and claimed Commonwealth elicited/failed to correct perjured testimony from D.B.; sought relief based on conflicting evidence and past acquittals.	Commonwealth pointed out the 2017 report was not in the certified record and that prior acquittals do not bar use of prior‑acts testimony; credibility is for the jury.	Court refused to consider the out‑of‑record DNA report; held prior acquittals do not negate admissibility of relevant bad‑acts testimony and credibility was for jury.
4. Brady / prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory/impeachment evidence	Corliss alleged ADA suppressed exculpatory evidence and credibility‑undermining materials (custody filings, letters, inconsistent statements), arguing materiality under Brady/Bagley.	Commonwealth argued Corliss had equal access or could have obtained the materials with reasonable diligence.	Court held no Brady violation: defendant had (or could have had) access to the cited materials, so suppression claim fails; some claims waived for not being raised in concise statement.

Key Cases Cited

Commonwealth v. Corban Corp., 909 A.2d 406 (Pa. Super. 2006) (statute of limitations/tolling principles)
Commonwealth v. Groff, 548 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. 1988) (when statute of limitations issues are questions of fact vs. law)
Commonwealth v. Stockard, 413 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1980) (Commonwealth not required to allege tolling in information so long as defendant is not prejudiced)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1985) (Brady materiality standard for impeachment evidence)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (reasonable‑probability standard for Brady materiality; effect on confidence in verdict)
Commonwealth v. Ardinger, 839 A.2d 1143 (Pa. Super. 2003) (prior acts testimony admissible even if not resulting in conviction; credibility for jury)
Commonwealth v. White, 491 A.2d 252 (Pa. Super. 1985) (separate harm analysis—sexual offense and incest can be distinct offenses)