Appellant was convicted by a jury of rape, 1 incest, 2 indecent assault, 3 and simple assault, 4 arising from a series of sexual assaults of his natural daughter. Post trial motions were timely filed and denied on May 3, 1983. Appellant was sentenced concurrently to 4 to 15 years for the rape conviction, 2V2 to 5 years for the incest conviction and 1 to 2 years on the indecent assault conviction. Appellant filed a motion to modify sentence on the grounds that the rape and incest offenses merge for sentencing purposes. 5 This motion was denied on June 1, 1983, and the instant appeal followed. We affirm.
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Appellant first contends that the lower court erred in imposing concurrent sentences for the offenses of rape and incest since both offenses arose out of a single act. Specifically, appellant contends that applying the “same transaction” test of
Commonwealth v. Ayala,
The test for determining whether one offense merges into another for purposes of sentencing is whether one crime necessarily involves the other. In order for one crime to necessarily involve the other, the essential elements of one must also be the essential elements of the other, (citations omitted)
Commonwealth v. Williams,
While our appellate courts have adopted the so-called “Blockburger” test for ascertaining legislative intent in merger/double jeopardy cases, this test is less than perfect.
*266 Although the Blockburger test is simply stated, it is subject to more than one interpretation, depending on the statutes involved. When one of the two statutes involved is a necessarily lesser included offense of the other, application of the Blockburger test will always raise the presumption that the two statutes involve the ‘same offense.’ Problems arise, however, when one statute is not a lesser included offense of the other.
People v. Robideau,
Applying this standard to the situation before us, we note that the crime of incest is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302 as follows:
§ 4302. Incest
A person is guilty of incest, a misdemeanor o.f the first degree, if he knowingly marries or cohabits or has sexual intercourse with an ancestor or descendant, a brother or sister of whole or half blood or an uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the whole blood. The relationships referred to in this section include blood relationships without regard to legitimacy, and relationship of parent and child by adoption.
The crime of rape is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121 as follows:
§ 3121. Rape
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse:
1) by forcible compulsion;
2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;
3) who is unconscious; or
*267 4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is incapable of consent.
Upon comparison of the above two criminal statutes, it becomes apparent that the rape statute requires proof of the elements of force, threat of force, unconsciousness or mental derangement, while the incest statute does not. Moreover, the incest statute requires kinship while the rape statute does not. Additionally, it is significant that these crimes are codified in different sections of the Crimes Code. Incest is codified in Chapter 43, which is titled “Offenses Against the Family”, while rape is codified in Chapter 31, which is titled “Sexual Offenses”, raising the implication that rape and incest constitute separate injuries to the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth and thus may be punished separately.
Commonwealth v. Adams,
In reviewing the doctrine of merger in this Commonwealth, we note that it has been traditionally applied to lesser included, constituent offenses which are codified in the same statute.
See Commonwealth v. Martin,
Appellant, citing
Commonwealth v. Walker,
In Commonwealth v. Tarver, supra, our Supreme Court stated:
The constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy has been held to consist of three separate guarantees: (a) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal; (b) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (c) protection against multiple punishments for the same *269 offense. Illinois v. Vitale,447 U.S. 410 ,100 S.Ct. 2260 ,65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980); U.S. v. Wilson,420 U.S. 332 ,95 S.Ct. 1013 ,43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975); North Carolina v. Pearce,395 U.S. 711 ,89 S.Ct. 2072 ,23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). . . . The double jeopardy provision does not restrain the legislature in its role in defining crimes and fixing penalties.
Id.,
In
Commonwealth v. Norris,
Appellant next contends that the lower court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of 4 to 15 years for the *270 offense of rape. 8 Specifically, the appellant claims that the sentence was excessive when viewed commensurately with the nature of the offense, the protection of the public and the rehabilitative needs of the appellant.
It is well settled that Pennsylvania trial judges are vested with broad sentencing discretion with which the appellate courts will not interfere absent manifest abuse.
Commonwealth v. Green,
In the instant case, the sentence imposed, while rigorous, is within the statutory limits.
9
.After considering the appellant’s past history of sexually abusing and beating his children, his prior criminal record and the recommendation of the Children and Youth Services counselor, the sentencing judge concluded that appellant should be incar
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cerated in order to both protect his family and further his rehabilitation. Moreover, the sentencing judge thoroughly set forth his reasoning on the record as required by
Commonwealth v. Riggins,
Finally, appellant contends that the evidence supporting his convictions of rape and incest was insufficient and contrary to the evidence and/or the weight of the evidence so as to require a new trial.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘we view the entire record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom favorable to the Commonwealth, determine whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie,498 Pa. 245 , 248,445 A.2d 1203 , 1204 (1982). See also Commonwealth v. Davis,308 Pa.Super. 204 , 216,454 A.2d 92 , 98 (1982); Commonwealth v. Price,306 Pa.Super. 507 , 511,452 A.2d 840 , 842 (1982). ‘[I]t is the province of the trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence produced. The fact finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.’ Commonwealth v. Nunez,312 Pa.Super. 584 , 586,459 A.2d 376 , 377 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Tate,485 Pa. 180 , 182,401 A.2d 353 , 354 (1979).
Commonwealth v. Henry,
Applying the above standard to the instant case, we find that Marissa Diane White, age 20, a freshman student at Penn State University, was the natural daughter of appellant. In November, 1981, Marissa lived in the family home, a two story, four bedroom apartment, along with her seven younger brothers and sisters. When Marissa was 14 to 15 years of age, the appellant, who was head of the *272 household, began attempting to touch her breasts and genital areas. These actions were accompanied by threats of violence. As Marissa grew older, appellant proposed to engage in sexual intercourse with her. When Marissa reached her late teens, the frequency of appellant’s sexual propositions increased.
The record discloses that the appellant, through beatings and threats thereof, forced the victim to engage in sexual intercourse and that the victim never voluntarily consented. At the age of sixteen, Marissa became impregnated by the appellant, who subsequently helped her obtain an abortion. On November 5, 1981, the appellant forced the victim to engage in sexual intercourse by beating her with a fan belt. Additionally, on November 25, 1981, the appellant fondled Marissa’s breasts without her consent. The victim, on at least one occasion, reported this activity to her mother, who failed to take any effective action. Due to the nature of the crimes and the father-daughter relationship, Marissa never reported these incidents to anyone else. At trial, the appellant did not testify in his own behalf; however, the testimony of his wife contradicted Marissa’s testimony regarding the time when Marissa first complained to her of the appellant’s conduct.
Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we find that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient is dismissed.
As stated above, appellant also contends that his convictions were not supported by the evidence and/or the weight of the evidence in that the jury failed to accept the testimony of the appellant and his supporting witnesses. We conclude that this claim is without merit and agree with the lower court’s finding that the testimony of the victim was not so incredible or so unreliable as to justify the granting of a new trial. It is well settled that even the uncorroborated testimony of a victim, if believed by the trier of facts, is sufficient to support a conviction despite
*273
contrary evidence from defense witnesses.
Commonwealth v. Stone,
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Notes
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(1), (2).
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(1).
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).
. The sentencing judge held that the indecent assault conviction did not merge with the rape or incest convictions since it arose out of a separate incident that occurred on November 25, 1981. There was no sentence imposed on appellant’s simple assault conviction as the sentencing judge found that it merged with his rape conviction because all three offenses occurred during the November 5, 1981 incident (S.T., May 5, 1983, 34-35).
. We note that crimes which are not lesser included offenses and are not codified in the same statute merge under the felony-murder doctrine.
See Commonwealth v. Fortune,
. This reasoning is followed in several other jurisdictions.
See, e.g., McGee v. People,
. We note that this case is not subject to the sentencing guidelines, effective July 22, 1982, see 204 Pa.Code § 303.1 et seq., 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1) provides a 20 year maximum sentence for a felony of the first degree (i.e., rape).