218 A.3d 442
Pa. Super. Ct.2019Background
- Rusty Lee Brensinger was convicted in 1998 of third-degree murder for the 1997 death of 16-month-old Brittany Samuels; sentence 20–40 years. Direct appeals and a first PCRA/federal habeas were unsuccessful.
- In 2015 Brensinger (with counsel from Mark Freeman and the Pennsylvania Innocence Project) obtained expert reports challenging the shaken-baby diagnosis and filed a facially untimely second PCRA petition asserting the newly discovered facts exception.
- PCRA hearings (2016) produced testimony from four experts who identified evolving scientific principles about abusive head trauma and witnesses about when counsel became involved.
- The PCRA court denied relief as untimely, finding the underlying scientific principles were publicly available earlier and that Brensinger had been represented since at least 2009 (invoking the public-record presumption).
- On appeal en banc, this Court held Brensinger was unrepresented from 2008–2015 (so Burton’s pro se prisoner exception applies), but remanded because the PCRA court failed to identify which scientific principles constituted the ‘‘facts’’ and when they entered the public record.
Issues
| Issue | Brensinger’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether petition qualified under PCRA newly discovered-fact exception (§9545(b)(1)(ii)) | Expert opinions obtained in 2015 are the newly discovered facts; petition filed within 60 days | Under Edmiston the ‘‘facts’’ are the underlying scientific principles, many of which were publicly available earlier; Brensinger failed due diligence | Remanded: Burton applies (he was pro se 2009–2015) but PCRA court must determine which scientific principles are the ‘‘facts’’ and when they became public so timeliness can be decided |
| Whether public-record presumption applied (i.e., was he represented earlier) | He was not represented by counsel before 2015; thus presumption inapplicable under Burton | Counsel (PIP/Freeman) had involvement since 2009–2011; presumption should apply | Held for Brensinger: record shows no formal representation until 2015; he was a prospective client, so Burton’s pro se exception applies for 2009–2015 |
| Whether PCRA timing provisions are unconstitutionally vague as applied to claims based on evolving science | Statute vague because it does not specify when evolving scientific developments trigger the 60-day clock | Statute applied according to precedent; not unconstitutionally vague | Not reached on merits—remanded for fact-finding about what facts triggered the clock, so vagueness claim is unripe |
| Whether Peterkin/Edmiston should be overruled | Peterkin and Edmiston wrongly permit jurisdictional time bars and the public-record presumption | Precedent controls; statute is constitutional as applied | Court cannot overrule Supreme Court; issues preserved but no relief granted here |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017) (pro se incarcerated petitioner exception to public-record presumption; court must determine actual knowledge and due diligence)
- Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013) (‘‘facts’’ for §9545(b)(1)(ii) are underlying scientific principles; publicly available principles do not qualify)
- Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 173 A.3d 617 (Pa. 2017) (distinguished Edmiston where press release revealed previously nonpublic factual admissions by the FBI)
- Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1998) (PCRA timing provisions jurisdictional; upheld against constitutional challenge)
- Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (timeliness exceptions and remand for fact-finding on due diligence)
- Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520 (Pa. 2006) (public-record presumption: information of public record generally cannot be ‘‘unknown’’ for §9545(b)(1)(ii))