Com. v. Black, A.
1316 MDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Aug 16, 2016Background
- On Jan. 9, 2014 Dauphin County probation officers (POs) went to 2145 N. Fifth St. for a routine probation check of Antoine Black; a 3–4-year-old opened the door and a ~20-year-old woman said Black was upstairs. Black’s mother was present on the couch.
- POs proceeded upstairs, saw Black through a partially open bedroom door, entered, and (per PO testimony) obtained Black’s consent to search the room. Black disputed consent and said officers entered without permission.
- POs observed a scale and baggies in plain view in the closet area and seized a bag of suspected crack cocaine from a coat pocket after Black allegedly told them about money in the pants; police were then summoned and executed a warrant, recovering more drugs, a handgun, and cash.
- At a suppression hearing, testimony conflicted as to who consented (child, unidentified woman, Black) and whether the POs made inquiries about the third party’s authority; Black’s mother testified she did not consent and that officers ran upstairs.
- Trial court denied suppression; following a stipulated bench trial Black was convicted of firearm and drug offenses and sentenced to 5–10 years. The Superior Court reversed the judgment of sentence, finding the warrantless entry/search unlawful and the seized evidence should have been suppressed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Black) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether POs had valid consent to enter the residence | Entry was justified because the child answered and the 20‑year‑old confirmed Black was upstairs, which gave apparent consent | No valid consent: child lacked capacity; the 20‑year‑old lacked apparent authority; Black’s mother did not consent | No valid consent from either person; entry was unlawful |
| Whether the 20‑year‑old had apparent authority to admit officers | Her statement that Black was upstairs sufficed for reasonable belief she had authority | Officers failed to inquire about her status and homeowner (mother) was present; they could not reasonably rely on apparent authority | Apparent authority was not established; officers should have made further inquiries |
| Whether a 3–4‑year‑old can consent to entry | (Implicit) any affirmative response at the door can be treated as consent | A toddler lacks maturity and authority to consent; mother's presence overrides child’s response | A 3–4‑year‑old cannot validly consent to entry |
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion/exigent circumstances to search without a warrant | Prior admission (months earlier) of marijuana sales and in‑room observations supported the search | No contemporaneous reasonable suspicion or exigency; officers conducted a warrantless, suspicionless search of room and person | No reasonable suspicion or exigency shown; search violated probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights; evidence suppressed |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Pennsylvania, 692 A.2d 1031 (Pa. 1997) (parolee/probationer has diminished but not extinguished Fourth Amendment rights)
- Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 477 A.2d 1309 (Pa. 1984) (age is one factor in voluntary consent analysis; minority alone does not automatically preclude consent)
- Strader v. Commonwealth, 931 A.2d 630 (Pa. 2007) (apparent third‑party authority to consent is measured by what a reasonable officer would believe)
- Wilson v. Commonwealth, 67 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2013) (county probation officers may search only upon reasonable suspicion under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9912(d))
- Smith v. Commonwealth, 85 A.3d 530 (Pa. Super. 2014) (routine home visits are not searches, but subsequent plain view or other facts may give rise to reasonable suspicion to search)
- Strickler v. Commonwealth, 757 A.2d 884 (Pa. 2000) (consensual search following unlawful seizure is tainted absent a break in the causal chain and voluntariness)