Com. v. Ball, K.
Com. v. Ball, K. No. 76 WDA 2017
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jun 20, 2017Background
- Appellant Kenneth E. Ball, Jr. was convicted by a jury of terroristic threats and two counts of simple assault after an incident in which he smashed a car window, punched the driver, and threatened one occupant with a knife.
- The Commonwealth offered a plea of 6 to 24 months (less one day) plus three years’ probation; Appellant rejected it and proceeded to trial.
- At sentencing the court imposed standard-range sentences on all counts and ran them consecutively, producing an aggregate term of about 3 years, 2 months to 9 years. Appellant did not object, file post-sentence motions, or appeal.
- Appellant filed a PCRA petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal and for failing to consult with him about appealing the harsher sentence.
- The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing, credited trial counsel’s testimony that he had warned Appellant pretrial about the risk of high, consecutive standard-range sentences if convicted, and found counsel had no duty to further consult; the PCRA court denied relief.
- The Superior Court affirmed, concluding counsel reasonably relied on the court’s sentencing discretion and Appellant’s failure to request an appeal; no Flores–Ortega duty to consult was triggered under the circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Ball's Argument | Counsel/PCRA Court's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not filing a direct appeal | Counsel should have filed or filed nunc pro tunc because Ball would have sought appeal of an unexpectedly high, consecutive sentence | Counsel reasonably believed Ball understood appellate deadlines and had been warned pretrial of sentencing risks; Ball did not ask counsel to appeal | Denied — no per se failure because Ball did not clearly request an appeal and counsel had reasonable basis not to file |
| Whether counsel had a duty to consult about an appeal under Flores–Ortega/Touw | A rational defendant would want to appeal given sentence far exceeded plea and probation recommendations | No; counsel warned Ball pretrial that loss at trial could produce top-of-range consecutive sentences and Ball’s demeanor indicated acceptance | Denied — no duty to consult arose because facts did not indicate a rational defendant would seek appeal |
| Whether counsel’s inaction lacked a reasonable basis | Ball: counsel should have contacted him after sentencing and filed post-sentence motions preserving discretionary-sentencing claims | Counsel relied on sentencing discretion jurisprudence and the trial court’s articulated reasons; this was a reasonable strategic choice | Denied — counsel had reasonable strategic basis given standard-range, consecutively-run sentence and court’s stated reasons |
| Whether Appellant demonstrated prejudice from counsel’s failure to consult or file | Ball: would have timely filed post-sentence motion and appeal but for counsel’s omission | PCRA found Ball had been informed of rights and did not ask for appeal; no reasonable probability of a different outcome shown | Denied — Ball failed to prove prejudice required by Flores–Ortega/Mason |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601 (Pa. 2015) (PCRA ineffective-assistance framework)
- Roe v. Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (U.S. 2000) (duty to consult about appeal and prejudice standard)
- Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d 1250 (Pa. Super. 2001) (applying Flores–Ortega in Pennsylvania)
- Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999) (failure to file a requested direct appeal is per se ineffective assistance)
- Commonwealth v. Gonzalez–Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595 (Pa. Super. 2010) (consecutive vs. concurrent sentencing generally does not present a substantial question)
- Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365 (Pa. Super. 2012) (extreme/exceptional circumstances required to raise substantial question on consecutive sentences)
- Commonwealth v. Liston, 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009) (restoration of post-sentence rights not automatic when appellate rights restored)
