Com. v. Axe, C.
Com. v. Axe, C. No. 1338 MDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Apr 10, 2017Background
- Clayton Raymond Axe was convicted by a jury of attempted sexual assault and indecent exposure; sentenced to 54 months to 10 years and sexual offender registration for 10 years.
- Direct appeals concluded when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on January 6, 2014; judgment became final April 7, 2014 (after certiorari period expired).
- Axe filed a first PCRA petition alleging trial counsel ineffectiveness; it was denied after an evidentiary hearing, and the denials were affirmed on appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denying allowance in April 2016.
- Axe filed a second PCRA petition on June 6, 2016, raising claims including ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel; the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice and dismissed the petition on July 14, 2016.
- The Superior Court reviewed whether the second petition was timely and whether any statutory exception to the PCRA one-year time bar applied.
Issues
| Issue | Axe's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of second PCRA petition | The petition was timely because it was filed within 60 days of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s April 12, 2016 denial of review of the first PCRA, relying on Lark | The judgment became final in April 2014; the 2016 petition is untimely and does not meet any statutory exception | Petition untimely; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel can satisfy §9545(b)(1)(ii) (new facts) | Axe claimed PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness was a newly discovered fact permitting relief | The Commonwealth argued such claims do not constitute newly discovered facts for timeliness exceptions | Court held prior precedent bars treating PCRA counsel ineffectiveness as newly discovered facts; exception not met |
| Whether any other §9545 exceptions apply (government interference or new retroactive right) | Axe did not successfully invoke other exceptions | Commonwealth argued no statutory exception applies | No statutory exception proven; time bar stands |
| Application of Lark re filing after resolution of prior PCRA | Axe relied on Lark to assert the 60‑day filing window began on April 12, 2016 | Commonwealth agreed Lark gives a 60‑day window but maintained exceptions still required if judgment was already past one year finality | Court applied Lark: 60‑day rule satisfied, but substantive §9545 exceptions still required and were not met |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277 (Pa. 2016) (standard of review for PCRA denials)
- Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2016) (rejecting equitable exception for untimely petitions challenging PCRA counsel performance)
- Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245 (Pa. 2013) (PCRA denial review standard authority cited)
- Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 (Pa. 2000) (timing rule for filing subsequent PCRA petitions after resolution of pending PCRA)
- Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780 (Pa. 2000) (ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel not treated as newly discovered fact for timeliness)