183 A.3d 364
Pa.2018Background
- Parolee Earnest Moreno absconded; Parole Agent Finnegan, with U.S. Marshals, went to 4745 N. 2nd St. believing it was Moreno’s residence and knocked to execute an arrest warrant.
- The address belonged to Angel Romero and Wendy Castro (third parties); officers entered the basement, observed suspected marijuana, called Philadelphia PD, obtained a search warrant, and seized drugs, paraphernalia, and a handgun.
- Romero and Castro moved to suppress evidence; the suppression court credited their lack of consent and Finnegan’s entry as unlawful and granted suppression based on staleness and lack of probable cause linking Moreno to the residence.
- The Superior Court reversed, applying Pennsylvania precedent construing Payton’s language to allow entry when officers reasonably believed the arrestee lived at the premises.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to resolve the tension between Payton’s dictum (arrest warrant may permit entry into suspect’s home) and Steagald (arrest warrant does not authorize entry into a third party’s home), and to determine the proper standard for establishing residence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Romero/.Castro) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an arrest warrant authorizes entry into a third party’s home to execute the arrest warrant | Arrest warrant did not authorize entry into their home; information was stale and insufficient to show Moreno lived there; Steagald requires a search warrant for third-party homes | Payton (and Superior Court precedent) permits entry when officers reasonably (and here reasonably) believed the arrestee lived at the premises | Entry into a third party’s home requires a magisterial probable-cause determination to search that home; Payton’s dictum cannot supplant Steagald; remand to allow the Commonwealth to produce the arrest warrant for its contents |
| Whether the Superior Court improperly considered contradicted Commonwealth testimony on consent | Romero/Castro: suppression court found no consent; contradicted testimony cannot be credited on appeal | Commonwealth: consent unnecessary if Payton applies | Superior Court erred; record supports suppression court finding there was no consent; Commonwealth must justify nonconsensual entry by valid warrant or exception |
| Standard for when Payton permits entry (what "reason to believe" means) | "Reason to believe" must not be a low subjective standard; officers’ post hoc testimony insufficient | Commonwealth urged a reasonable-belief test (as applied by Superior Court) | Court adopts that Payton’s "reason to believe" requires probable cause and, more importantly, that a neutral magistrate must make the probable-cause determination as to the residence (via a search warrant or equivalent language in an arrest warrant) |
| Remedy and next step | Suppression affirmed if no magisterial finding supported entry | Commonwealth should be allowed to show the arrest warrant itself may have contained a magistrate's finding authorizing entry/search | Court reversed Superior Court and remanded so Commonwealth can present the arrest warrant; if warrant lacks magisterial probable-cause for the premises, suppression stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1980) (warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a routine felony arrest is prohibited; dictum suggested an arrest warrant may implicitly carry limited authority to enter suspect’s dwelling)
- Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (U.S. 1981) (an arrest warrant for one person does not authorize entry into a third party’s home absent a search warrant or exigent circumstances)
- Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (U.S. 1981) (referencing Payton dictum to uphold limited detentions incident to execution of a search warrant)
- Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (U.S. 1990) (protective sweeps incident to arrest inside a home are permissible if supported by reasonable suspicion; cited Payton dictum regarding authority to search where arrestee might be found)
- Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (U.S. 1999) (police may not bring media or other third parties into a home during execution of a warrant when their presence is not in aid of the execution)
- United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467 (3d Cir. 2016) (analyzed Payton’s "reason to believe" language and held that, given Steagald and home privacy interests, the standard must be equivalent to probable cause)