Com. of Pa. v. Montgomery
181 A.3d 359
Pa. Super. Ct.2018Background
- In 2002 Stephen Montgomery (age 22 at the time of the offense) was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) as required by statute.
- Montgomery’s judgment became final in January 2006 after direct review; he filed multiple PCRA petitions over the years, including a third petition pending when he filed a fourth in March 2016. The fourth was dismissed as untimely on June 2, 2016.
- The PCRA court treated the fourth filing as a PCRA petition and dismissed it for failing to plead an applicable timeliness exception; Montgomery argued Miller/Montgomery entitled him to relief despite being over 18 at the time of the offense.
- The Superior Court en banc considered (1) whether a PCRA court may hear a subsequently filed PCRA petition while an earlier petition is still pending before that court and (2) whether Miller/Montgomery applies to adults whose brains were allegedly not fully developed at the time of their crimes.
- The court also addressed whether Montgomery’s filing should have been treated as a habeas corpus petition rather than a PCRA petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a PCRA court has jurisdiction to decide a subsequent PCRA petition while an earlier PCRA petition is pending before the same court | Montgomery: court may consider a later petition even if an earlier one is pending | Commonwealth: agrees PCRA court may consider subsequent petitions unless prior petition is on appeal | Court: PCRA courts may entertain multiple petitions relating to the same judgment concurrently unless a prior PCRA order is under appellate review (i.e., not final) |
| Whether Miller v. Alabama / Montgomery v. Louisiana provides a timeliness exception for adults (22 at offense) claiming undeveloped brains | Montgomery: Miller’s prohibition on mandatory LWOP should apply to adults with underdeveloped brains; Montgomery made Miller retroactive | Commonwealth: Miller applies to juveniles (under 18); Montgomery made Miller retroactive only for juveniles — does not extend to adults | Court: Miller applies only to offenders under 18; adult (22) cannot invoke Miller/Montgomery timeliness exception; petition untimely |
| Whether the petition should have been treated as a habeas corpus petition instead of a PCRA petition | Montgomery: court should have treated his filing as habeas corpus and granted relief for illegal sentence | Commonwealth: filing alleges an illegal sentence but such claims fall within PCRA exclusivity | Court: Petition properly characterized as PCRA because PCRA is the exclusive vehicle for collateral claims alleging illegal sentence |
| Whether Montgomery is entitled to relief from mandatory LWOP under the Equal Protection Clause | Montgomery: argues Miller should be extended under Fourteenth Amendment to adults who have underdeveloped brains | Commonwealth: no Supreme Court or state high court extension of Miller to adults; extension cannot be judicially created for individual claims | Court: Extension not recognized by higher courts; attempt to extend Miller to adults fails; timeliness exception not met |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 (Pa. 2000) (holds subsequent PCRA petition barred while prior PCRA order is under appellate review)
- Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2012) (permits filing of subsequent PCRA petition where prior petition was held in abeyance and no appeal pending; clarifies Lark’s scope)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Eighth Amendment: mandatory LWOP unconstitutional for juvenile homicide offenders)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (makes Miller retroactive to cases on collateral review for juvenile offenders)
- Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa. Super. 2016) (applies Miller strictly to those under 18 and rejects extension to adults claiming underdeveloped brains)
- Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493 (Pa. 2016) (confirms PCRA is exclusive means for collateral relief, subsuming habeas claims)
