Columbus v. Mitchell, 2016 Ohio 7873

Defendant Russell Mitchell, an over‑the‑road truck driver, was stopped in Columbus while driving westbound on I‑70 inside I‑270 and cited under Columbus City Code 2551.06(a) for transporting hazardous materials on a route presumed to go through densely populated areas.
Mitchell’s load included hazardous materials destined for Cincinnati and non‑hazardous materials with a delivery point inside I‑270.
The municipal environmental court found Mitchell guilty of a first‑degree misdemeanor and fined him; he appealed.
Mitchell argued the ordinance was ambiguous: the phrase “destination (delivery point) within the city” could mean a delivery point for the truck’s entire load (including non‑hazardous items) rather than for the hazardous materials specifically.
The city argued the ordinance plainly restricts routes for hazardous materials unless those hazardous materials have an origin or delivery point inside the city.
The trial court’s conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, which held the ordinance unambiguous and applicable to the hazardous materials notwithstanding other non‑hazardous deliveries inside the city.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Columbus City Code 2551.06(a) is ambiguous regarding what constitutes a “destination (delivery point) within the city.”	The ordinance is plain and prohibits transporting hazardous materials on inner routes unless the hazardous materials themselves have an origin or delivery point inside the city.	The phrase is ambiguous and should be read to allow a truck carrying both hazardous and non‑hazardous goods to use inner routes if the truck has any delivery point inside the city.	The ordinance is unambiguous: the exception applies to the hazardous materials’ origin/destination only; conviction affirmed.

Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312 (statute plain meaning; apply not interpret)
State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254 (courts must give effect to statutory words)
State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5 (ambiguity exists only if more than one reasonable interpretation)
State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 508 (definition of statutory ambiguity)
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (rule of lenity’s touchstone is statutory ambiguity)
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (rule of lenity does not apply absent ambiguity)
State v. Polus, 145 Ohio St.3d 266 (use R.C. 1.49 factors when statute ambiguous)