Colorado Motor v. Town of Vail, 153 F.4th 1052

The Town of Vail enacted an ordinance restricting most motor vehicles in its pedestrian mall areas, with some exceptions, including for high-volume commercial carriers and Town-approved contractors.
In 2023, the Town amended the ordinance to remove the exception for high-volume commercial carriers.
The Colorado Motor Carriers Association (CMCA), representing trucking companies, sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the amended ordinance, and also challenged the original ordinance.
The district court enjoined the amended ordinance but declined to enjoin the original ordinance, citing lack of irreparable injury.
Both parties appealed: Vail on the injunction of the amended ordinance, and CMCA on the refusal to enjoin the original ordinance.
The appellate court considered federal preemption under the FAAAA and ADA, as well as standards for preliminary injunctions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Vail’s amended ordinance is preempted by federal law or falls under the motor vehicle safety exception	Ordinance is preempted; safety exception does not apply because regulation is not genuinely responsive to safety concerns	Ordinance falls within safety exception; it regulates for pedestrian safety in the malls	The amended ordinance is likely covered by the safety exception; preemption does not apply
Whether the amended ordinance is “genuinely responsive” to safety concerns required by the federal exception	No logical nexus to safety; ordinance regulates by owner, not by type/size or actual risk	Ordinance motivated by safety; discretion on implementation, contract limits use to small vehicles	The ordinance had a sufficient logical nexus to safety; court should defer to local policymakers
Whether preliminary injunction should issue against the amended ordinance	Likely to succeed on merits and face irreparable harm without injunction	No likelihood of success; harm is speculative or delayed	District court erred in granting injunction; injunction should be dissolved
Whether preliminary injunction should issue against the original ordinance	Delay should not bar injunction; irreparable injury exists	Long delay undercuts irreparable injury; status quo is unaltered	District court did not abuse discretion in denying injunction

City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (recognizes breadth of FAAAA safety exception for local regulation)
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (sets four-factor test for preliminary injunctions)
Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253 (purpose of preliminary injunction is to preserve status quo)
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (explains scope of ‘relating to’ language in preemption statutes)
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (legislature may approach solutions incrementally; courts should defer to policy choices)
Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710 (delay can undercut showing of irreparable harm for injunction)