2023 CO 56
Colo.2023Background
- On St. Patrick’s Day 2014, passenger Curt Glinton assaulted Colorado Cab driver Ali Yusuf in the cab; Jose Garcia intervened to help and was then attacked by Glinton, who stole the taxi and used it as a weapon, running over Garcia and causing severe injuries.
- Garcia sued Colorado Cab for negligence (alleging failure to install a partition and interior cameras) and unjust enrichment, asserting the rescue doctrine extended Colorado Cab’s duty to him as a rescuer.
- A jury awarded Garcia $1,605,000, apportioning fault 45% to Colorado Cab and 55% to Glinton; the trial court denied directed-verdict/JNOV motions by Colorado Cab.
- On appeal the Colorado Court of Appeals initially held Colorado Cab owed no duty, this court reversed (Garcia II) and remanded; on remand the division held that Glinton’s theft/use of the cab was an unforeseeable superseding cause as a matter of law, limiting Colorado Cab’s liability.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted review and held that proximate cause in the rescuer context turns on whether the rescuer’s injuries were reasonably foreseeable from the defendant’s tortious conduct and the nature of the rescue attempt, reversed the court of appeals’ ruling, and reinstated the jury verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Glinton’s theft and use of the cab as a weapon was a superseding cause that cut off Colorado Cab’s liability | Garcia: theft/use was a foreseeable escalation of the same assault; jury should decide proximate cause | Colorado Cab: commandeering/use was unforeseeable, thus an intervening superseding act as a matter of law | Court: not for the court as matter of law here; reasonable jury could find theft/use foreseeable and within scope of risk — reinstated verdict |
| Standard for proximate cause in rescuer cases — what must rescuer prove | Garcia: rescuer must show injuries were reasonably foreseeable from defendant’s negligence and the nature of the rescue | Colorado Cab: urged a narrower foreseeability/superseding-cause approach (and argued Third Restatement supports limiting liability) | Court: rescuer must show injuries reasonably foreseeable from defendant’s tortious conduct and nature of rescue; foreseeability remains the touchstone |
| Role of Restatement (Third) §32 (risk standard) vs traditional foreseeability | Garcia: traditional foreseeability governs; Section 32 is consistent but not required | Colorado Cab: relied on Section 32 to argue that later volitional acts should be treated as superseding | Court: §32’s risk-language is consistent with Colorado’s foreseeability approach; court neither fully adopts nor rejects §32 but applies classic foreseeability analysis |
| Whether proximate-cause could be decided as matter of law on these facts | Garcia: proximate cause was a jury question given evidence of foreseeable escalation | Colorado Cab: urged court to decide as matter of law that theft/use was unforeseeable | Court: proximate cause is generally for the jury unless only one inference is possible; here reasonable jurors could find foreseeability, so issue goes to jury |
Key Cases Cited
- Wagner v. Int’l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921) (formative articulation of the rescue doctrine: "danger invites rescue")
- City of Aurora v. Loveless, 639 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1981) (appellate deference to jury findings on proximate cause; only in clearest cases may court decide as matter of law)
- Build It and They Will Drink, Inc. v. Strauch, 253 P.3d 302 (Colo. 2011) (foreseeability is the touchstone of proximate cause; plaintiff need not show exact manner of injury)
- Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987) (foreseeability measured by common-sense perceptions of risk; unusual manner of harm does not negate foreseeability)
- Ekberg v. Greene, 588 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1978) (intervening criminal acts do not absolve liability if they were reasonably foreseeable)
- Deines v. Atlas Energy Servs., LLC, 484 P.3d 798 (Colo. App. 2021) (proximate cause may be established even if actor did not foresee precise means of injury)
- Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Wagner, 467 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2020) (explains general proximate-cause and appellate-review principles)
