Colony Insurance Company v. AL & Sons Corp., 3:14-cv-01051

Colony Insurance, as subrogee for Regeneration, LLC (owned by Roy Granger), paid to settle claims arising from a May 12, 2013 fire at the Pepperell (Gray) Mill in Opelika, Alabama and sued Al & Sons Corp. and its sole shareholder Al Mitchell for common-law indemnity to recover that amount.
Regeneration had contracted with Al & Sons to remove ferrous/non-ferrous metals; parties dispute whether Al & Sons acted as an independent subcontractor or under Regeneration’s control.
Saucier Investments (co-owner of the property) sued Regeneration, Granger, Al & Sons, and Mitchell in state court alleging negligence against all defendants; the state action and a related federal declaratory action were resolved by a global, confidential settlement in mediation.
Colony paid 32% of the settlement; Al & Sons’ insurer paid the remaining 68%. During mediation Colony notified defendants it intended to pursue common-law indemnity.
On summary judgment, defendants argued that being sued as joint tortfeasors in the underlying action precludes indemnity as a matter of law; Colony argued exceptions apply because defendants were independent contractors whose negligence primarily caused the fire.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Colony may pursue common‑law indemnity despite underlying suit naming parties as joint tortfeasors	Colony: Exceptions to the joint‑tortfeasor rule apply because Al & Sons/Mitchell were independent contractors whose negligence primarily caused the fire	Defendants: Being sued as joint tortfeasors bars indemnity as a matter of law	Denied summary judgment; joint‑tortfeasor status is not dispositive — factual issues preclude resolution on summary judgment
Whether the insurance‑contract theory (defendant failed to maintain $2M per occurrence) supports indemnity	Colony initially advanced it but conceded ambiguity and abandoned the argument	Defendants challenged the contract interpretation	Court treats the contract‑coverage theory as abandoned and does not decide it
Whether court can decide proximate/primary cause and fault allocation on summary judgment	Colony: factual record supports inference that defendants’ conduct primarily caused the fire	Defendants: underlying joint pleading establishes bar to indemnity and supports summary judgment	Court: Determinations of fault and proximate cause require factfinding; summary judgment would impermissibly decide disputed facts, so motion denied

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary‑judgment burden allocation principles)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (nonmovant must show genuine factual dispute beyond metaphysical doubt)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (court must draw all justifiable inferences for nonmovant at summary judgment)
Parker Towing Co. v. Triangle Aggregates, Inc., 143 So. 3d 159 (Ala. 2013) (states Alabama general rule barring contribution/indemnity among joint tortfeasors absent statute or contract)
Crigler v. Salac, 438 So. 2d 1375 (Ala. 1983) (recognizes exceptions allowing indemnity where claimant lacked fault or another was primary proximate cause)
Mallory S.S. Co. v. Druhan, 84 So. 874 (Ala. Ct. App. 1920) (early formulation of exceptions to joint‑tortfeasor rule)
Unicore, Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 768 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussing Mallory passive negligence analysis and its continued validity under Alabama law)
Coates v. CTB, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 1200 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (applying Alabama law on indemnity exceptions)
SouthTrust Bank v. Jones, Morrison, Womack & Dearing, P.C., 939 So. 2d 885 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (citing cases on indemnity and contribution principles under Alabama law)