128 F. Supp. 3d 487
D.R.I.2015Background
- In Feb–Mar 2010 Portsmouth High School had a girls’ lacrosse head‑coach vacancy; Athletic Director Lunney informally offered the job to Michael Borrosh and he was hired and later ratified by the School Board. The position was posted online but Judy Colman — an applied, certified coach and then‑assistant lacrosse coach and head girls’ tennis coach — was not interviewed.
- Borrosh had youth coaching and military leadership experience and limited formal lacrosse coaching credentials; he submitted application paperwork after being offered the job. Colman had coaching certifications (including a near‑complete US Women’s Lacrosse Level 1 certificate), assistant lacrosse experience, and a record as head tennis coach.
- Plaintiffs: Judy (failure to hire; RICRA/RIFEPA discrimination and retaliation) and her daughter Hadley (third‑party retaliation and a Title IX claim based on alleged disadvantage to female students by hiring male coaches).
- Defendants: Town of Portsmouth, Athletic Director Michael Lunney, Finance/Personnel Director David Faucher, and Michael Borrosh. Defendants moved for summary judgment.
- Court held that (a) genuine issues exist on gender discrimination (Counts I & II) as to all defendants except Borrosh, so summary judgment denied as to those defendants; (b) summary judgment granted for all defendants on Judy’s RICRA retaliation (Count III), Hadley’s RICRA retaliation (Count IV), and Hadley’s Title IX claim (Count V); (c) court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Judy established a prima facie failure‑to‑hire gender‑discrimination claim | Colman: she was qualified under the posted requirement (“coaching experience”), had certifications and assistant coaching experience, and was as or more qualified than Borrosh | Defendants: Colman lacked sport‑specific playing experience and was not sufficiently qualified; emergency hiring justified shortcutting the process | Court: Prima facie case established (material factual disputes exist); jury issues on qualifications as posted criteria were vague — summary judgment denied as to defendants except Borrosh |
| Whether Defendants’ stated nondiscriminatory reason (season urgency) was pretext | Colman: timeline, lack of competitive process, and a pattern of not interviewing women show pretext | Defendants: season urgency and timing made immediate hire necessary | Held: Defendants met production burden, but evidence (posting/receipt of apps, timeline, historical non‑interviewing of female applicants) permits a jury to find pretext — deny summary judgment (except as to Borrosh) |
| Judy’s RICRA retaliation (Count III) — causation and timing | Judy: reporting offensive email and filing RICHR complaint led to adverse hiring decisions | Defendants: no causal connection; email complaint unrelated to defendants; RICHR complaint filed after the 2010 hire | Held: Summary judgment for defendants — no causal link and temporal sequence defeats retaliation claim |
| Hadley’s RICRA third‑party retaliation (Count IV) — adverse action and causation | Hadley: diminished playing time and loss of captaincy were retaliation for Judy’s protected activity | Defendants: coaching decisions were tactical and non‑material; no evidence of causation or pretext | Held: Summary judgment for defendants — adverse acts not sufficiently material or causally connected; speculative |
| Title IX claim (Count V) and jurisdiction | Hadley: systemic discrimination by hiring male coaches disadvantaged female students | Defendants: complaint lacks necessary factual/legal sufficiency; Title IX does not authorize suit against individual school officials | Held: Summary judgment for defendants on Title IX; federal claim dismissed but court exercised supplemental jurisdiction to retain the surviving state claims |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for proving disparate treatment via indirect evidence)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; materiality and genuine dispute test)
- Burdine (Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine), 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (burden‑shifting and methods to prove pretext)
- Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011) (third‑party/associational retaliation standing principle)
- Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (Title IX does not authorize suits against individual school officials)
- Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 381 F.3d 207 (1st Cir. 2004) (definition of improper discriminatory motivation)
- Rodriguez‑Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfr., Inc., 399 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2005) (jury role on prima facie issues in employment cases)
- Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2004) (use and limits of statistical evidence in disparate treatment cases)
- LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993) (statistical evidence rarely sufficient alone to rebut legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons)