Collins v. Navistar, Inc.
155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 137
Cal. Ct. App.2013Background
- In a strict products liability case, William Collins was injured when a 2.5-pound concrete chunk thrown from a freeway overpass penetrated his Navistar truck windshield; the thrower was a 15-year-old who later pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon.
- Plaintiffs alleged the windshield was defectively designed (steep rake) or could have been redesigned with glass-plastic to resist debris.
- A special verdict found the criminal act to be a superseding cause, and Navistar obtained judgment.
- Barbara challenged jury instructions and verdict on foreseeability, evidentiary rulings, and exclusion of glass-plastic evidence; Navistar conceded some errors but urged harmless error.
- The California Supreme Court held the design-defect foreseeability standard for strict products liability applies regardless of third-party criminality and reversed for a new trial; it also ruled the glass-plastic evidence should not have been barred and that CACI 411/433 errors were prejudicial, remanding for retrial.
- On remand, the court may reframe the foreseeability analysis under Soule and consider glass-plastic evidence consistent with FMVSS 205.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Foreseeability standard when third-party criminal acts occur | Collins argues no heightened foreseeability; third-party crime does not negate duty | Navistar argues criminal act is superseding and foreseen risk applies only to natural/ negligent acts | Heightened foreseeability not required; foreseeability of risk governs duty; error in instruction |
| Effect of criminal conduct instructions (CACI 411/433) on liability | Instructions wrongly tied foreseeability to criminal act to relieve liability | Navistar argues those instructions correctly framed defenses | Instructional errors prejudicial; reversal and remand for new trial |
| Admissibility of glass-plastic evidence under federal preemption | Evidence of alternative design should be admitted to show feasible safer design | FMVSS 205 may preempt state design claims; evidence should be excluded | Exclusion improper; preemption acknowledged but not harmless; remand for new trial with glass-plastic theory |
| Premises-liability negligence standard vs. products-liability design defect standard | Premises-negligence concept should inform products defect analysis | Premises standard does not apply to strict products liability | Premises negligence definitions do not apply to strict products liability; risk-benefit framework governs |
Key Cases Cited
- Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548 (Cal. 1994) (foreseeability and risk-benefit in design defects; vehicle safety)
- Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal.3d 49 (Cal. 1983) (foreseeability includes reasonable risk even from third parties; drunk driver case)
- Bunton v. Arizona Pacific Tanklines, 141 Cal.App.3d 210 (Cal. App. 1983) (road emergencies are foreseeable; third-party criminal acts may be foreseeable risks)
- Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (U.S. Supreme Court 2000) (preemption framework for federal safety standards and state claims)
- Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc., 32 Cal.4th 1138 (Cal. 2004) (premises-liability duty to foresee and address third-party crime in certain contexts; distinguish from products liability)