Collier v. District of Columbia
46 F. Supp. 3d 6
D.D.C.2014Background
- In June 2013, security guards Owen Collier and Anthony Smart escorted LaQuan Williams and an entourage out of Stadium Nightclub after suspected drug use; an altercation ensued in the parking lot.
- Plaintiffs allege Williams punched Smart; MPD Officer Marques McRae allegedly struck Collier in the eye with a baton causing serious injury.
- Plaintiffs sued Williams, Officer McRae, and the District of Columbia; the Second Amended Complaint pleads state tort claims and § 1983 claims for excessive force.
- Williams moved to dismiss the battery/assault claims against him; the District moved to dismiss Collier’s negligence and § 1983 claims (and argued notice under D.C. Code § 12-309).
- The court dismissed Collier’s claim against Williams (proximate-cause/superseding intervening act issue), denied dismissal of Smart’s battery claim (but severed and remanded it to D.C. Superior Court), dismissed Fifth Amendment claims, and allowed Collier’s negligence and Monell-style Fourth Amendment claims to proceed against the District.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Can Collier hold Williams liable for injuries inflicted by Officer McRae (assault/battery/proximate causation)? | Collier: Williams’ intentional assault on Smart foreseeably led to the melee and Collier’s injuries. | Williams: No physical contact with Collier; intervening intentional act by officer is a superseding cause; no duty to Collier. | Dismissed: Collier failed to state assault/battery or negligence against Williams; third‑party intentional act was a superseding cause. |
| 2) Does Smart adequately plead assault and battery against Williams? | Smart: Complaint (incorporating facts) alleges Williams intentionally punched him and caused injury. | Williams: Pleading is barebones; fails to allege apprehension, intent, justification, or detailed damages. | Denied: Complaint sufficiently alleges assault and battery; claim severed and remanded for lack of federal jurisdiction. |
| 3) Should Smart’s claim remain joined with Collier’s claims in federal court? | Plaintiffs: originally joined as co-occurring injuries from same incident. | Defendants: After dismissal of Collier’s claim against Williams, remaining claims involve different defendants and issues. | Severed and remanded: Smart’s Count VII severed; remanded to D.C. Superior Court; Smart and Williams dropped from federal case. |
| 4) Are Collier’s negligence and § 1983 claims against the District subject to dismissal? | Collier: Gave § 12-309 notice; pleads negligent training/supervision and an official custom (failure to file PD 914 use-of-force reports) causing excessive force. | District: Argues notice alleges intentional misconduct not negligence; § 1983 claim fails absent a municipal policy/custom showing; Fifth Amendment claim subsumed by Fourth. | Mixed: Fifth Amendment claims dismissed; negligence and Fourth Amendment (Monell) failure-to-train/custom allegations survive pleading stage; § 12-309 notice adequate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (documents considered on Rule 12(b)(6)).
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must be plausible, not merely speculative).
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not accepted as true on a motion to dismiss).
- Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires a policy or custom causing constitutional violation).
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (failure-to-train liability requires deliberate indifference by policymakers).
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force claims judged under Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process).
- Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (remand required if federal court lacks original jurisdiction).
- District of Columbia v. Beretta, 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (heightened foreseeability required to impose duty for third-party criminal misuse).
- Convit v. Wilson, 980 A.2d 1104 (D.C. 2009) (proximate cause requires direct and substantial causal relationship).
- Potts v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 1249 (D.C. 1997) (heightened foreseeability when harm results from third-party criminal act).
- Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (third-party intentional act may be a superseding cause relieving earlier actor of liability).
- Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1987) (elements of negligence).