163 A.3d 777
D.C.2017Background
- In 1998 Long was convicted of first-degree murder while armed and sentenced to life without parole (LWOP); convictions were affirmed but his sentence was later vacated and remanded for resentencing after this court found appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise an Apprendi claim.
- Over ~13 years Long filed multiple postconviction motions under D.C. Code § 23-110 (1996 Repl.): a 2003 § 23-110 (denied after hearing), a 2012 pro se § 23-110 (denied without a hearing), and a 2016 § 23-110 (filed after resentencing) repeating claims from 2012.
- The Superior Court resentenced Long in May 2014, entering a new judgment imposing 35 years–to–life for first-degree murder; the judgment was entered nunc pro tunc to 1998.
- The government argued Long’s later § 23-110 motions were barred as "second or successive;" Long relied on Magwood v. Patterson and related federal authority to argue a new judgment (resentencing) permits a new § 23-110 motion attacking sentence and/or conviction.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals held the § 23-110 "second or successive" bar is judgment-based and, because Long’s 2016 motion followed a new judgment after resentencing, it was not procedurally barred; the court vacated denial of the 2016 motion and remanded for merits consideration.
- Separately, the court held the trial court erred in imposing a 35–years–to–life minimum because governing law at the time of the offense required only a life sentence (parole eligibility after 30 years) and left parole eligibility to the paroling authority; the murder sentence was vacated and remanded for proper sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Long) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Long’s 2016 § 23-110 motion is "second or successive" | 2016 motion follows a new judgment after resentencing, so Magwood permits collateral attack on sentence and conviction | 2016 motion is successive and barred because it reasserts claims raised earlier | Court: § 23-110 "second or successive" bar is judgment-based; resentencing produced a new judgment so 2016 motion is not barred; vacate dismissal and remand for merits |
| Whether resentencing produced a "new judgment" resetting second-or-successive analysis | Resentencing produced a new judgment and therefore allows a fresh § 23-110 application per Magwood | Initially argued resentencing did not create a new judgment (abandoned later) | Court: resentencing with a new judgment and commitment order is a new judgment; Magwood applies |
| Scope of the judgment-based rule: may a post-resentencing motion attack the original conviction (not just sentence)? | A new judgment permits attack on conviction and/or sentence; denying that would produce impractical results and unfair incentives | Government urged a narrower reading limiting Magwood to sentence-only challenges | Court: adopts the majority federal-circuit view—new judgment permits § 23-110 attacks on conviction and/or sentence without invoking "second or successive" bar |
| Whether the new sentence (35 years–to–life) complied with statutory law at time of offense | Long: statute required only a life sentence (no minimum); parole eligibility set by paroling authority after 30 years | Government: did not defend the sentence on appeal (misplaced briefing) | Court: trial court lacked authority to impose a minimum or range; sentence vacated and remanded for sentencing consistent with statute (life imprisonment; parole eligibility after 30 years) |
Key Cases Cited
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) ("second or successive" bar is judgment-based; a new judgment after resentencing permits a fresh habeas application)
- King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining and applying Magwood's judgment-based rule to permit post-resentencing challenges to conviction or sentence)
- Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2010) (§ 2255/§ 2254 interpretation treating sentence and judgment interchangeably for postconviction purposes)
- Insignares v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 755 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014) (post-Magwood discussion of new-judgment consequences for successive-petition rules)
- Beale v. United States, 465 A.2d 796 (D.C. 1983) (Congress established mandatory life imprisonment for first-degree murder and deferred parole eligibility rule)
- Garris v. United States, 491 A.2d 511 (D.C. 1985) (trial judge lacked discretion to impose anything other than statutorily mandated life sentence for first-degree murder)