Coleman v. State, 407 P.3d 502

Background

Coleman was convicted by a jury of second-degree burglary, second-degree theft, fifth-degree criminal mischief (for breaking into a commercial bicycle-storage shed and stealing two bikes), and making a false report.
The shed: a permanent wooden structure with four walls, floor, roof, and individual padlocked storage lockers; testimony that it held ~20–25 bicycles and employees sometimes fully entered it (entry required stooping).
Police arrived ~8–9 minutes after an alarm, found a forced-open shed door and two bikes outside; found Coleman’s van high-centered nearby and Coleman attempting to leave in a taxi.
A tracking dog led from the shed to the bicycles, to Coleman’s van, and to the gas station where Coleman got into the taxi. Keys to Coleman’s van were later found on his person.
Coleman admitted at trial he lied to police about chasing his stolen van (said he lied because his license was suspended). The jury convicted on all counts; on appeal Coleman argued the shed was not a “building,” identity evidence was insufficient, the trial court erred denying a new trial, and his false statement was not a criminal “report.”

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Coleman)	Held
Whether the bicycle shed is a "building" under the burglary statute	The shed is a permanent structure adapted for carrying on business (storing bikes) and thus fits the statutory and ordinary meaning of "building."	Shed too small; not designed for human habitation and not large enough for people to move comfortably, so cannot be burglarized.	Court: Shed qualifies as a "building" (permanent roofed/walled structure that people sometimes enter); burglary conviction affirmed.
Sufficiency of evidence tying Coleman to the burglary/theft/mischief	Circumstantial evidence (forced door, bikes outside, van nearby, dog track linking shed→van→gas station, Coleman fleeing) supports conviction.	Evidence is speculative; dog-track and circumstantial proof insufficient to identify Coleman as perpetrator.	Court: Viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict, sufficient for a reasonable juror to convict; convictions affirmed.
Trial court’s denial of motion for new trial (weight of the evidence)	Evidence was strong; denial proper.	Verdict against weight of evidence; trial court abused discretion.	Court: No abuse of discretion; evidence not so slight as to make verdict plainly unreasonable; denial affirmed.
Whether Coleman’s false statement to police was a criminal "false report" under AS 11.56.800(a)(2)	The false claim that his van was stolen was a report that a crime occurred and thus criminal.	Statement was made only in response to police questioning, not a formal report, not intended to prompt police action, and police did not act on it — so not a "false report."	Court: Reversed false-report conviction. Holding: statute requires a knowingly false statement made under circumstances that objectively create a reasonable likelihood police would act on it; Coleman’s statement did not meet that standard.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Essig, 571 P.2d 170 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (upheld burglary conviction for a substantial storage shed as a "building")
State v. Handley, 843 P.2d 456 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (storage locker held to be a building under burglary statute)
State v. Barker, 739 P.2d 1045 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (self-contained storage units qualify as buildings in the ordinary sense)
State v. Webb, 324 P.3d 522 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (business-adapted tractor trailer held to be a building)
State v. Scott, 590 P.2d 743 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (railway boxcar not a building where it was merely a vehicle for transporting goods)
Paugh v. State, 9 P.3d 973 (Wyo. 2000) (very small containers too small to accommodate a human are not burglarizable structures)
State v. Miller, 954 P.2d 925 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (burglary generally concerns structures large enough to accommodate a human)
State v. Deitchler, 876 P.2d 970 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (structure too small for human occupancy is not a building for burglary purposes)