Coleman v. District of Columbia
70 F. Supp. 3d 58
D.D.C.2014Background
- Coleman, a 76-year-old veteran with dementia, is represented by guardian Bunn in a suit against DC.
- DC tax-sale scheme sells delinquent tax liens to private purchasers who may add costs; surplus equity is potentially taken.
- Coleman’s $133.88 tax bill plus penalties, costs, and interest grew into a lien of about $317.35 and was sold to Embassy in 2007.
- Embassy foreclosed; Superior Court later entered a default judgment extinguishing Coleman’s title; DC deed conveyed to Embassy in 2010.
- Coleman’s home, valued around $200,000, was later evicted and sold for $71,000; he alleges the District’s statute took all equity without compensation.
- Coleman brings three-count suit challenging the taking of surplus equity under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and requests damages, just compensation, and declaratory relief; the District moves to dismiss, which the court denies after a September 26, 2014 hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tax Injunction Act bars Counts One and Three | Coleman argues surplus-equity claim is not a challenge to tax collection. | District contends claims relate to tax collection and are barred. | Not barred; surplus equity taking is independent of the tax collection itself. |
| Ripeness of Takings claim (Count II) | Coleman has no adequate state remedy; claim ripe. | State remedies exist; claim premature. | Ripe; no adequate state inverse-condemnation remedy under DC law. |
| Rooker-Feldman applicability | Coleman seeks damages for aDistrict statute, not to overturn the Foreclosure Judgment. | Case is impermissible review of a state court judgment. | Not barred; claim seeks independent relief from statute, not direct challenge to the judgment. |
| Res judicata applicability | Could not have argued Takings in prior action; not barred. | Cross-claims could have been raised; res judicata applies. | Not barred; lack of compulsory cross-claim against District; not adversarial in Kolb sense. |
Key Cases Cited
- Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956) (surplus proceeds may be recoverable under certain statutes; taking analysis)
- Lawton v. United States, 110 U.S. 146 (1884) (surplus must be refunded; taking if surplus not returned)
- Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (Tax Injunction Act limited to state-tax-revenue collection; narrow scope)
- Balthazar v. Mari Ltd., 396 U.S. 114 (1969) (summary affirmance; no broad preclusion of surplus-equity claims)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman clarified as narrow, not universal bar)
- Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012) (limits of Rooker-Feldman and interrelation with state judgments)
- Ritter v. Ross, 558 N.W.2d 910 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizes surplus-proceeds Takings inquiries when surplus exists by statute)
- Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956) (surplus value and rights to surplus under tax sales; precedential)