473 P.3d 467
Okla.2020Background
- Michael Cole was arrested for suspected DUI on Feb 18, 2018, and refused breath/blood testing; officer served notice of license revocation under Oklahoma's implied consent law.
- Cole, through counsel, faxed a written request for an administrative hearing within the statutory period; DPS rejected the fax under an amended administrative rule that allows hearing requests only by mail or in person.
- DPS called Cole's counsel and sent a courtesy letter advising that faxes were no longer accepted and instructing him to resubmit by mail or in person; Cole did not correct the submission.
- DPS revoked Cole’s license for one year; Cole sued in district court alleging denial of procedural due process. The district court remanded for an administrative hearing.
- The Court of Civil Appeals agreed a due-process violation occurred but ordered the revocation set aside; the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, reinstating DPS’s revocation order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) May DPS, by rule, prescribe how hearing requests must be submitted? | DPS cannot impose method-of-delivery restrictions beyond the statute; fax satisfied the statutory "writing" requirement. | Legislature delegated rulemaking authority to agencies; DPS may set procedural rules for receiving requests. | Held: DPS has rulemaking authority; it may designate acceptable submission methods. |
| 2) Does the DPS rule conflict with the statutory requirement (47 O.S. § 754) that a hearing request be "in writing"? | § 754 requires only a written request; additional agency-imposed delivery limits conflict with statute. | The statute does not specify delivery method; the agency rule fills procedural details; legislative silence implies acquiescence. | Held: No controlling conflict; rule is within DPS's authority and valid. |
| 3) Was Cole's faxed request sufficient to trigger a hearing? | Cole timely submitted a written request by fax; it should have triggered a hearing. | The amended OAC expressly disallowed faxes; Cole’s fax was therefore insufficient. | Held: Cole’s fax did not comply with OAC § 595:1-3-7 and was insufficient to trigger a hearing. |
| 4) Did DPS’s refusal to grant a hearing deprive Cole of procedural due process, and what is the remedy? | Cole was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard through no fault of his own; revocation should be set aside or the case remanded for a hearing. | Cole failed to avail himself of the hearing procedure required by DPS; DPS afforded due process (including courtesy notice) and no relief is warranted. | Held: No due process violation; Cole failed to follow the rule; district court order remanding for a hearing is reversed and DPS’s revocation stands. |
Key Cases Cited
- Estes v. ConocoPhillips Co., 184 P.3d 518 (Okla. 2008) (administrative rules have force and effect of law)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (due process is flexible; assess opportunity to be heard in context)
- Pierce v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 327 P.3d 530 (Okla. 2014) (speedy-hearing principles; facts distinguishing delayed-scheduling cases)
- Nichols v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 392 P.3d 692 (Okla. 2017) (agency timing obligations for hearings)
- Grubb v. Johnson Oil Ref. Co., 179 P.2d 688 (Okla. 1947) (opportunity to be heard as component of due process)
- Osprey L.L.C. v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co., 984 P.2d 194 (Okla. 1999) (fax can suffice for notice in contract context—distinguished here)
- Cornett v. Carr, 302 P.3d 769 (Okla. 2013) (agency rules cannot impose requirements inconsistent with statute)