Cody Rutledge v. State of Indiana, 28 N.E.3d 281

Around midnight on July 6, 2013, Deputy Hurst observed a maroon minivan whose driver appeared to have trouble keeping the vehicle on the road; the van twice pulled into residential driveways briefly and then left.
Deputy Hurst followed, ran the plate (which showed a different town), turned back, approached the parked minivan on foot (not using lights or siren), tapped the driver’s window, and found Cody Rutledge slumped over the center console.
Deputies smelled alcohol, saw an open container, and observed signs of impairment; Rutledge refused chemical testing but a blood warrant later produced a .19 BAC.
Rutledge was charged with operating while intoxicated (felony), driving while suspended (misdemeanor), and later alleged an habitual substance offender; he was convicted and sentenced with enhancements.
At trial Rutledge objected that the initial contact and ensuing evidence were the product of an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution; the trial court overruled and admitted the evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Rutledge)	Held
Whether the deputies’ approach to the parked minivan and initial contact was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment	The encounter was consensual or, if a stop, reasonable suspicion supported an investigatory stop based on erratic driving, brief driveway stops, and evasive conduct	The approach and positioning (headlights, presence of two deputies, door opened) would make a reasonable person feel restrained; no reasonable suspicion justified a stop	Court held the initial contact was consensual and not a Fourth Amendment seizure; alternatively, even if a stop occurred, reasonable suspicion existed and the evidence was admissible
Whether the deputies’ conduct was reasonable under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution	Degree of suspicion (signs of impaired driving, odd driveway stops, occupant slumped over) justified minimal intrusion to investigate	Intrusion was not justified by the facts; local travel shouldn’t alone draw suspicion and intrusion implicated Section 11 protections	Court applied the Holder balancing test and concluded the intrusion was minimal and justified; no Section 11 violation

Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. 2013) (distinguishes consensual encounters from Fourth Amendment seizures and outlines objective test for freedom to leave)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (U.S. 1991) (objective test for whether police ‘show of authority’ effects a seizure)
Mendenhall v. United States, 446 U.S. 544 (U.S. 1980) (factors suggesting a person was not free to leave in police encounters)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (officers may conduct brief investigatory stops on reasonable suspicion)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000) (nervous, evasive behavior can contribute to reasonable suspicion)
Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362 (Ind. 2014) (reasonable suspicion standard and de novo review of constitutional questions)
Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930 (Ind. 2006) (Section 11 reasonableness balancing test: concern, intrusion, law enforcement needs)
Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (definition of reasonable suspicion)
Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 2001) (Article 1, § 11 analyzed independently from the Fourth Amendment)
State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. 2008) (burden on State to justify searches/seizures under Section 11)