Cody Jones v. City of Elyria, Ohio
947 F.3d 905
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Elyria police responded to a report of a possibly intoxicated man eating from a dumpster and found Cody Jones talking with two women in a plaza; officers admit they were not investigating a crime when they contacted him.
- Officers Weber and Chalkley conducted a pat-down, then took Jones to the ground; the parties sharply dispute whether Jones resisted, attempted to punch or seize an officer’s gun, or was subdued while offering no resistance.
- Officer Mitchell arrived during the pat-down/scuffle, held Jones’s legs to assist in subduing him, and did not tase or strike him; all three officers prepared patrol narratives describing resistance.
- Jones was indicted (based largely on the officers’ narratives read to the grand jury), later acquitted, and then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio state law for excessive force, wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and related claims.
- The district court denied qualified immunity to the individual officers (treating much of the conduct collectively); on interlocutory appeal the Sixth Circuit reviewed qualified-immunity and Ohio official-immunity decisions.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of immunity for Weber and Chalkley on wrongful arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution claims, but held Mitchell entitled to qualified immunity and state-law immunity on the wrongful-arrest and excessive-force claims based on her later arrival and limited role.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wrongful arrest — Weber & Chalkley (federal) | Jones: pat-down and arrest lacked reasonable suspicion/probable cause; arrest violated Fourth Amendment | Officers: had reasonable suspicion and probable cause; state suppression hearing found probable cause | Denied immunity: no reasonable suspicion for frisk; no probable cause to arrest under plaintiff-favoring facts; rights clearly established |
| Wrongful arrest — Mitchell (federal) | Jones: Mitchell assisted and thus is liable for unlawful arrest | Mitchell: arrived after pat-down, did not observe initiating events, reasonably secured scene; entitled to individualized analysis | Reversed as to Mitchell: qualified immunity granted for wrongful-arrest claim given her limited, late-arriving role |
| Excessive force — Weber & Chalkley (federal) | Jones: officers used strikes and taser while he was nonresistant; force was excessive | Officers: used force to subdue perceived resistance and possible threat | Denied immunity: viewing facts favorably to Jones, force was unnecessary and rights clearly established |
| Excessive force — Mitchell (federal) | Jones: Mitchell had opportunity to intervene or prevent force and instead held his legs | Mitchell: she arrived amid an ongoing struggle and reasonably assisted to secure scene; did not strike or tase | Reversed as to Mitchell: qualified immunity granted for excessive-force claim based on her perspective and limited actions (lead); concurrence/dissent dispute this outcome |
| Malicious prosecution — All officers (federal) | Jones: officers submitted false narratives that influenced grand jury and prosecution despite lack of probable cause | Officers: indictment presumptively establishes probable cause; no knowing falsehoods | Denied immunity: jury could find officers knowingly made false statements that induced prosecution and there was no probable cause; malicious-prosecution claim survives |
| State-law immunity (Ohio) — wrongful arrest & malicious prosecution | Jones: officers acted wantonly/maliciously in instituting prosecution and in effecting unlawful arrest | Officers: claim official immunity unless acted with malice, bad faith, or wanton/reckless conduct; Mitchell argues separate treatment | Court: Weber & Chalkley not entitled to Ohio immunity on wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution; Mitchell is entitled to state-law immunity on wrongful-arrest claim but may face malicious-prosecution claim based on alleged false narratives |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishes reasonable-suspicion limit on stop-and-frisk)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (probable cause required to defeat wrongful-arrest claim; qualified immunity context)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (excessive-force analysis under the Fourth Amendment)
- Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (malicious-prosecution § 1983 elements and officer liability for false investigatory statements)
- Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793 (officer liability when false investigatory materials influence prosecutor)
- Wilkerson v. City of Akron, 906 F.3d 477 (limits on reasonable suspicion for pat-downs)
- United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560 (discussion of speculative conduct insufficient for reasonable suspicion)
- Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640 (individualized assessment of officers’ conduct for liability)
- Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858 (excessive-force principles emphasizing no interest in continuing force after neutralization)
- Crawford v. Geiger, [citation="656 F. App'x 190"] (late-arriving officers evaluated based on circumstances apparent at arrival)