Cody James Fortin v. State, 374 P.3d 600

In 2009 Fortin was convicted by jury of aggravated battery and a deadly-weapon enhancement; he later received an additional consecutive sentence in a separate case. He sought post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel during plea negotiations.
Fortin, pro se, moved the district court to take judicial notice of the entire files (trial and appellate) in his underlying and a related criminal case; the court denied the blanket request for lack of specificity.
The court appointed counsel for Fortin; Fortin did not amend his request or identify particular documents over the next ~20 months.
The district court summarily dismissed Fortin’s post-conviction petition, concluding (1) his judicial-notice request failed to satisfy I.R.E. 201(d), (2) he was not denied access to the courts, and (3) he failed to prove Strickland prejudice from counsel’s alleged failure to advise him about possible consecutive sentencing if he rejected the plea.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the district court properly denied blanket judicial notice, Fortin’s access-to-courts claim failed, and he did not show a reasonable probability the court would have accepted the alleged plea that would have produced a lesser sentence.

Issue	Fortin's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Judicial notice under I.R.E. 201(d)	District court erred by refusing to take judicial notice of entire case files; his request was sufficiently specific	I.R.E. 201(d) requires identifying specific documents or providing copies; blanket requests are improper	Denial affirmed — I.R.E. 201(d) requires specificity; blanket requests are not mandatory for judicial notice
Access to courts (constitutional)	Denial of requested judicial notice deprived him of meaningful access and an adequate appellate record	Fortin failed to preserve the claim below and, in any event, had opportunity to procure and present records; any lack of record was his own omission	Rejected — no unconstitutional denial; post-conviction procedures and time to amend gave Fortin adequate opportunity
Ineffective assistance of counsel (plea-stage) — prejudice under Strickland/Lafler/Frye	Counsel advised him to reject a joint plea resolving two cases; but for counsel’s advice he would have accepted and received a lesser, concurrent sentence	Fortin cannot show prejudice because he cannot prove the trial court would have accepted the alleged plea (court routinely does not accept binding pleas)	Rejected — Fortin failed the prejudice prong; no reasonable probability the court would have accepted the plea as presented

Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (prejudice in plea context requires showing reasonable probability plea would have been accepted, entered, and less severe than actual outcome)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) (duty to communicate plea offers; prejudice analysis includes whether prosecutor or court would have allowed plea to stand)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826 (2010) (party requesting judicial notice must identify specific documents with particularity under I.R.E. 201(d))
Newman v. State, 149 Idaho 225 (Ct. App.) (judicial notice governed by I.R.E. 201; evidentiary determination reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (prisoners’ right of access to courts requires reasonable opportunity to present nonfrivolous claims)