Close v. Thomas
653 F.3d 970
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Congress required BOP to provide RDAP and located priority based on proximity to release date.
- § 3621(e)(1) and (e)(2) authorize RDAP and discretionary one-year early release for nonviolent offenders.
- Questions arose whether BOP should include projected § 3621(e) release dates when ranking RDAP wait-list proximity.
- Historically BOP varied in incorporating early-release potential into proximity; current policy excludes it.
- Oregon district court Thurman held that wait-list proximity must account for § 3621(e) early release date; district court later disagreed.
- Close and others challenged BOP’s RDAP wait-list ranking under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing statutory interpretation favors including early release.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 3621(e)(1)(C) require considering early release in RDAP proximity? | Close: must include projected § 3621(e) release date. | Thomas: plain language does not require inclusion of early release. | Statute unambiguous; no requirement to include early release. |
| Is the definition of 'release date' controlled by § 3624(a) for § 3621(e)(1)(C)? | Close: § 3624(a) defines release date to reflect early release. | Thomas: release date aligns with term expiration, not early release timing. | Yes; § 3624(a) defines 'date of release' for proximity calculations; not equated with earliest potential release. |
Key Cases Cited
- Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010) (plain-language interpretation controls when unambiguous)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (framework for agency statutory interpretation)
- Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2011) (jurisdictional limits on review of individualized RDAP determinations)
- United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc discussion on interpretive approach to similar statutes)
- High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 2004) (discusses deference standards when statute ambiguous)
