Clifton Leon Munday Jr. v. State
09-15-00277-CR
| Tex. App. | Jul 19, 2017Background
- Clifton Leon Munday Jr. was previously convicted in Florida (1989 pleas) of three counts of sexual battery (1988 offenses); he later moved to Polk County, Texas.
- After a 2009 Texas parole, Munday registered as a sex offender in Polk County and updated quarterly through December 2013; he failed to report in March/April and December 2014.
- Polk County deputy Gary Wright located Munday at a different address in 2014, warned him to update within seven days, and, after Munday did not, charged him with failing to comply with sex-offender registration (two consolidated indictments).
- The indictments alleged Munday’s Florida sexual-battery convictions were “reportable convictions” substantially similar to Texas sexual assault, requiring lifetime and quarterly registration under Texas Code Crim. Proc. ch. 62.
- Trial evidence included Department of Public Safety (DPS) memoranda (dating back to 2006 and a March 2015 update) and testimony by DPS attorney Randy Ortega that DPS had determined Florida’s sexual battery (use of force not likely to cause serious injury) is substantially similar to Texas sexual assault; jury convicted Munday on both counts; judge assessed concurrent 7-year sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Munday) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State proved DPS had determined Florida sexual battery is substantially similar to Texas sexual assault (required to classify a "reportable conviction"). | DPS memos and Ortega’s testimony show DPS made the substantially-similar determination before Munday’s offenses to support classification. | DPS did not make the required comparison before Munday’s arrest; State’s proof insufficient. | Affirmed: Evidence (2006 memos, Ortega testimony, March 2015 memo) permitted a juror to find DPS had so determined. |
| Whether the State proved Munday knowingly/intentionally failed to register (mens rea / notice). | Munday repeatedly registered through 2013, signed update forms warning of legal penalties, and was told by Deputy Wright to update — supporting knowing/intentionally failing to comply. | Without proof DPS notified Munday that his Florida convictions required Texas registration, State cannot prove knowledge. | Affirmed: Circumstantial proof (prior regular registrations, signed forms, Wright’s warning) supports a finding Munday knowingly/intentionally failed to comply. |
| Whether Florida sexual battery qualifies as a "sexually violent offense" under Chapter 62 (triggering lifetime and 90-day reporting). | DPS determination that Florida sexual battery (force not likely to cause serious injury) is substantially similar to Texas sexual assault means it qualifies as a sexually violent offense. | Florida statute does not match Chapter 62 offenses; State failed to prove similarity for lifetime-registration classification. | Affirmed: DPS’s prior comparison supports treating Munday’s Florida sexual-battery convictions as sexually violent offenses under Chapter 62. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (sex-offender registration not ex post facto punishment)
- Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. Crim. App.) (State must prove DPS comparison when relying on out-of-state convictions)
- Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. Crim. App.) (review sufficiency of evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
- Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App.) (drawing reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence)
- Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. Crim. App.) (registration offense elements)