Clifford Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff's Dep't
837 F.3d 678
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Clifford Tyler was involuntarily committed for ~30 days in 1986 after a depressive episode; evaluations in 2012 showed no current mental illness and a long history of stability.
- Tyler attempted to buy a firearm in 2011 but was blocked by NICS because of the 1986 commitment and could not obtain federal relief because § 925(c) was defunded; Michigan lacks a state relief program under the 2008 NICS Improvement Amendments Act.
- Tyler sued, alleging § 922(g)(4) (ban on those adjudicated mentally defective or committed) is unconstitutional as applied to him; the district court dismissed, relying on Heller’s dicta that bans on the mentally ill are “presumptively lawful.”
- The Sixth Circuit applied the two-step framework used in post-Heller cases: (1) historical scope inquiry and (2) means‑end scrutiny if within the Amendment’s reach.
- The court held that Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language does not categorically foreclose as‑applied challenges; it concluded Tyler plausibly falls within the Second Amendment’s ambit and that intermediate scrutiny applies; remanded because the government did not carry its burden to justify § 922(g)(4)’s lifetime ban as applied to Tyler on the existing record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Heller’s statement that bans on the mentally ill are “presumptively lawful” forecloses as‑applied Second Amendment claims against § 922(g)(4) | Heller’s dictum does not bar as‑applied challenges to a lifetime disability based on an old commitment | Heller’s language shows such prohibitions are outside the Amendment’s protection and thus precludes the claim | Court: Heller’s dictum is not conclusive; as‑applied challenges remain viable |
| Whether persons with a prior involuntary commitment fall outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment | Tyler: prior short, remote commitment does not make him categorically unprotected | Gov: legislative restrictions on the mentally ill historically justify exclusion | Court: historical evidence is inconclusive; prior commitment does not categorically place a person outside the Amendment |
| Proper level of scrutiny for § 922(g)(4) challenges | Tyler: lifetime bar to core self‑defense rights demands strict scrutiny | Gov: heightened scrutiny unnecessary given public safety interests; intermediate scrutiny suffices | Court: intermediate scrutiny is appropriate (Heller rejects rational basis but strict scrutiny is inappropriate here) |
| Whether § 922(g)(4) survives intermediate scrutiny as applied to Tyler | Tyler: lifetime, categorical ban is not substantially related to public safety given his decades‑long stability and no path to relief | Gov: protecting public safety and preventing suicide justifies a categorical lifetime ban; Congress’s choices and evidence suffice | Court: On current record, gov’t failed to show § 922(g)(4)’s lifetime ban is substantially related to its interests as applied to Tyler; remand for further proof or individualized showing required |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes an individual right to bear arms and notes that "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill" are "presumptively lawful")
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporates Second Amendment right against the States)
- United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71 (2002) (absence of an ATF denial can preclude judicial review under § 925(c))
- United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (adopts two-step Second Amendment framework used by the Sixth Circuit)
- United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (discusses limits of Heller dicta and applicability of categorical disqualifications)
- United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (analyzes § 922(g) provisions and scrutiny questions)
- United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (applies intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(9) and explains fit analysis)
- United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2012) (remanded § 922(g)(3) challenge for further evidence under heightened scrutiny)