Clemons v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
664 F. App'x 544
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Clemons, an African-American Metro employee, alleged he was denied opportunity to apply for a field-crew supervisor position filled in December 2012 by a Caucasian hire (Rich) via a temporary non-civil-service appointment that was not publicly posted.
- Rich’s appointment was later rescinded after a protest; Clemons filed a pro se EEOC charge on September 24, 2013 alleging race discrimination for denial of the opportunity to apply.
- In May 2014, Metro assigned Clemons and a co-worker to move very heavy furniture for a day or two; both claimed injury. Clemons filed a second (timely) EEOC charge alleging this was retaliation for his earlier charge.
- District court granted Metro summary judgment: (1) Clemons’s Title VII race-discrimination claim was time-barred because he did not show he had initiated proceedings with a state agency to extend the filing period; (2) Clemons failed to establish a prima facie retaliation claim and failed to show Metro’s nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed: agreed the race claim was untimely and, on the retaliation claim, held Clemons failed to show a causal connection and did not rebut Metro’s legitimate explanation for the furniture assignment.
Issues
| Issue | Clemons' Argument | Metro's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of race-discrimination claim | Pro se filing should be construed liberally; omission of state agency name should not bar tolling to 300 days | No evidence Clemons initiated proceedings with a state/local agency; therefore 180-day limit applies | Race claim time‑barred; district court correctly dismissed for lack of timely EEOC exhaustion |
| Adverse action for retaliation (assignment to move furniture) | Temporary reassignment to arduous manual labor is materially adverse and could deter filing charges | A one–two day furniture move is not materially adverse; even if it were, it was legitimate business decision | Court noted such assignments can be adverse but found Clemons failed to show causal link; summary judgment proper |
| Causation between protected activity and furniture assignment | Temporal proximity and deviation from protocol permit inference of causation | Eight-month gap and assignment included a co-worker; lack of close temporal proximity and shared assignment undermine causation | No causal connection shown (eight-month gap and coworker involvement fatal to inference) |
| Pretext for nondiscriminatory reason | Deviation from normal protocol and availability of other employees show Metro’s reasons are suspicious | Metro offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for selecting Clemons and coworker (crew availability, minimal disruption) | Clemons did not present evidence showing Metro’s reasons were pretextual; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980) (courts enforce Title VII filing deadlines to ensure prompt processing)
- Nichols v. Muskingum Coll., 318 F.3d 674 (6th Cir.) (Title VII requires timely EEOC charge and right-to-sue notice)
- Sutherland v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2003) (summary judgment burden and proof that nonmoving party lacks evidence for essential element)
- Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000) (elements required to establish a retaliation prima facie case)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (definition of materially adverse action in retaliation context)
- Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668 (6th Cir.) (temporal proximity and causation analysis in retaliation cases)
- Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714 (6th Cir.) (standard for materially adverse action in retaliation context)