Clavin v. County of Orange, 620 F. App'x 45

Clavin applied annually (2010–2013) for a Master Electrician’s License from Orange County and was repeatedly denied. He sued in Feb 2014 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process and that the local licensing law is unconstitutionally vague.
District court dismissed: held Clavin’s procedural due process claim time-barred (accrued in 2010) and rejected his vagueness challenge. Judgment for County (Clavin v. Cnty. of Orange, 38 F. Supp. 3d 391).
On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed de novo the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, accepting pleadings as true and drawing inferences for Clavin.
The court held each annual denial (2011–2013) constituted a separate actionable injury, so claims arising from denials in 2011–2013 were timely; the 2010 denial remained time-barred.
The court nonetheless affirmed dismissal because Clavin lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in the Master Electrician’s License: the local law gave the Licensing Board broad discretion to grant or deny licenses.
The court also affirmed rejection of the vagueness challenge, finding the statute provided sufficient standards for evaluating Master Electrician qualifications and did not encourage arbitrary enforcement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Accrual / limitations on §1983 claim	Each annual denial is a distinct unconstitutional act; thus 2011–2013 denials are timely	Claim accrued at first denial (2010), making suit time-barred	Each denial is a separate cause of action; 2011–2013 denials timely; 2010 denial time-barred
Property interest in license (due process)	Clavin had an entitlement to a Master Electrician’s License and thus a property interest	Local law vests Licensing Board with discretion; no enforceable entitlement	No protected property interest because statute grants the Board broad discretion; procedural due process claim fails
Vagueness of licensing statute	Statute unclear re: classes (B/C) and Master qualifications—fails to give fair notice and enables arbitrary enforcement	Statute specifies Master qualifications; individualized assessment is permissible; provides minimal guidelines	Statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Clavin; provides sufficient standards and does not encourage arbitrary enforcement
Continuing violation doctrine	2010 denial can be revived as part of a continuing violation	Discrete denials are separate; discrete acts time-barred cannot be revived	Continuing-violation theory rejected; discrete acts are individually actionable and time-barred if outside limitations period

Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2009) (standard of review on Rule 12(b)(6))
Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (three-year § 1983 statute of limitations in New York and accrual rule)
Connolly v. McCall, 254 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2001) (accrual focuses on when plaintiff knows of the harm, not merely of a policy)
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (property interest requires more than abstract expectation; entitlement depends on lack of official discretion)
Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 1999) (entitlement inquiry focuses on official discretion to grant or deny benefits)
Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002) (elements of a § 1983 procedural due process claim)
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (twofold vagueness test: fair notice and prevention of arbitrary enforcement)
Mannix v. Phillips, 619 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2010) (vagueness requires minimal guidelines but not meticulous specificity)
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (discrete acts are not actionable if time-barred despite relation to timely claims)
Clavin v. Cnty. of Orange, 38 F. Supp. 3d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (district-court decision below)
Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1996) (discretion to consider arguments not raised below when discussed by district court)