166 So. 3d 147
Ala. Crim. App.2014Background
- Freddie L. Clark was convicted of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance (sale of an "eight ball" of crack) based on a December 2011 controlled buy.
- Clark was sentenced October 11, 2013, as a habitual felony offender to 20 years plus two 5-year enhancements (school and public-housing proximity), totaling 30 years, plus fines and fees.
- Defense argued the new presumptive sentencing standards (effective October 1, 2013) governed Clark’s sentencing because his sentencing event occurred after that date and his offense is nonviolent.
- The State and trial court treated the matter under the Habitual Felony Offender Act (HFOA) and applied the enhancements, declining to apply the presumptive standards.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals examined the statutory scheme and the Alabama Sentencing Commission’s 2013 Report and concluded the legislature intended presumptive standards to apply to "applicable cases sentenced on or after October 1, 2013."
- The court reversed and remanded for resentencing under the presumptive sentencing standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the presumptive sentencing standards (effective Oct. 1, 2013) govern a sentencing event occurring after that date for an offense committed before that date | Clark: Sentencing event occurred Oct. 11, 2013; presumptive standards mandatory for nonviolent offenses sentenced on/after Oct. 1, 2013 | State: New standards are not retroactive; sentence should be governed by law at time of offense (apply HFOA and enhancements) | The court held the legislature intended the presumptive standards to apply to "applicable cases sentenced on or after Oct. 1, 2013." The sentence was reversed and remanded for resentencing under the presumptive standards. |
Key Cases Cited
- M.H. v. State, 6 So.3d 41 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (law at time of offense generally governs sentencing)
- Minnifield v. State, 941 So.2d 1000 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (same principle on controlling law)
- Davis v. State, 571 So.2d 1287 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (sentence determined by law in effect when offense committed)
- Hardy v. State, 570 So.2d 871 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (retrospective application not favored absent clear intent)
- Jefferson v. City of Birmingham, 399 So.2d 932 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (law in effect at time of offense governs prosecution)
- Zimmerman v. State, 838 So.2d 404 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (new statute not applied retroactively without clear legislative intent)
- White v. State, 992 So.2d 783 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (clarifies rule against retrospective application absent express intent)
- Jones v. Casey, 445 So.2d 873 (Ala. 1983) (retrospective statutes disfavored absent express retroactivity)
- Bracewell v. State, 401 So.2d 123 (Ala. 1981) (law at time of offense governs proceedings incident thereto)
- State v. Crittenden, 17 So.3d 253 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (historical discretion between sentencing standards and HFOA)
- Bole v. State, 86 So.3d 1088 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (procedural default for raising certain arguments first on appeal)