This is an appeal from an order declaring that the amendment to Code 1975, §
Mildred J. Jones originally brought suit against J.W. Casey in Montgomery Circuit Court, claiming breach of an oral real estate listing contract. On November 5, 1980, a judgment was entered against Casey in the amount of $84,403.77. This Court affirmed the judgment on appeal and on February 19, 1982, overruled Casey's motion for rehearing. Casey v. Jones,
During the pendency of the appeal the Alabama Legislature passed Act No. 81-1115, Third Special Session, 1981, which amended Code 1975, §
"`Judgments for the payment of money, other than costs, bear interest from the day of entry, at a rate
of twelve (12) percent per annum, the provisions of Section
8-8-1 of the Code of Alabama 1975 [which affixed a 6% interest rate on such judgments] notwithstanding. . . .'"
Act of Nov. 13, 1981, No. 81-1115, 1981 Ala. Acts 379 (codified at Code 1975, §
The amendment became effective on November 13, 1981, and neither the amendatory language nor the legislative history contained any provisions for retroactive application of the statute.
On May 24, 1982, Jones filed a declaratory judgment action against Casey in Montgomery Circuit Court to determine whether this amendment applied retroactively to judgments which were pending and unsatisfied at the time of its passage and effective date. After the case was transferred to the judge who heard the original action, Jones filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching an affidavit in support thereof. Casey then filed a motion to dismiss or an alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings. On July 16, 1982, both parties stipulated that the court need only decide whether the judgment rendered against Casey should bear interest at the *875 rate of 6% or 12% per annum. On November 9, 1982, the circuit court entered its order, which held that Act No. 81-1115, Third Special Session, 1981, did not apply to judgments pending at the time of its effective date and that the judgment against Casey bore interest at 6% rather than 12% per annum. Jones then filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
Whether the amendment to Code 1975, §
Approximately one half of the states deny retroactive application of the amendment based upon either of two grounds: 1) the pending judgment is characterized as contractual in nature and thus subject to the constitutional prohibition against the passage of acts impairing a contractual obligation,see, e.g., Texas P.R. Co. v. Anderson,
In Alabama, retrospective application of a statute is generally not favored, absent an express statutory provision or clear legislative intent that the enactment apply retroactively as well as prospectively. See Kittrell v. Benjamin,
Because the amendment raising the interest rate on judgments from 6% to 12% per annum contained no express provision or clear legislative intent that the statute operate retroactively, we can allow retroactive application only if the statute is deemed to be "remedial" in nature.
Alabama law defines remedial statutes as those "which impair no contract or vested right, and do not disturb past transactions, but preserve and enforce the right and heal defects in existing laws prescribing remedies." Dickson v.Alabama Mach. and Supply Co.,
We therefore follow those jurisdictions which hold that, except where the legislature provides otherwise, a statute changing the legal rate of interest on judgments does not apply retroactively to a judgment pending at the time of its effective date. The judgment in the amount of *876 $84,403.77 entered against Casey on November 5, 1980, thus bears interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All the Justices concur.