Clark v. Neese, 131 So. 3d 556

Helen Schroeder, a severely injured passenger with diminished mental capacity, was in a car driven by her husband Harry when a log truck rear-ended them, killing Harry.
In federal court, Helen (individually and as a wrongful-death beneficiary) claimed Sullivan’s negligence caused the accident and denied Harry’s negligence.
The federal court denied Sullivan’s summary judgment; Helen and Sullivan settled and executed a release, and the federal case was dismissed.
Helen then sued Harry’s estate in Mississippi circuit court, alleging Harry negligently failed to yield and pulled into Sullivan’s path at an extremely slow rate.
The estate moved for summary judgment, arguing Helen’s circuit complaint contradicted federal admissions and that the settlement barred the state claim through estoppel, accord and satisfaction, release, and merger.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the estate on judicial estoppel grounds, finding Helen knowingly contradicted her federal position and that the release evidenced acceptance of that position.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May denied federal admissions be used for judicial estoppel?	Schroeder contends Rule 36(b) controls; denial cannot trigger estoppel.	Estate argues admissions/denials aid evaluating inconsistent positions; federal rule is not controlling Mississippi law.	Yes; the trial court properly considered denied admissions for judicial estoppel.
Did Kirk establish the Mississippi test for judicial estoppel without an adverse-party requirement?	Kirk requires adverse parties to bar claims;estate relied on outdated rule.	Kirk provides three elements and does not require adverse parties.	The adverse-party requirement is eliminated; Kirk's three elements govern.
Did judicial estoppel bar Helen’s state-court claim against the estate?	Positions were not knowingly inconsistent; discovery caused a later development; no bar.	Helen’s inconsistent positions and settlement show an unfair advantage; estoppel applies.	Judicial estoppel does not bar; remand for other estoppel theories.
Should the case have been decided on other estoppel theories beyond judicial estoppel?	Address equitable estoppel, accord and satisfaction, release, merger.	Estoppel theories may apply; court should consider merits if estoppel alone is insufficient.	Remanded to address those theories; judicial estoppel reversed.

Kirk v. Pope, 973 So.2d 981 (Miss. 2007) (three elements of judicial estoppel; no adverse-party requirement)
Daughtrey v. Daughtrey, 474 So.2d 598 (Miss. 1985) (court cases guiding judicial estoppel doctrines)
Banes v. Thompson, 352 So.2d 812 (Miss. 1977) (early judicial estoppel authority in Mississippi)
Thomas v. Bailey, 375 So.2d 1049 (Miss. 1979) (discusses adverse-party considerations in judicial estoppel)
Rankin v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 912 So.2d 725 (Miss. 2005) (cites judicial estoppel lineage and related authorities)
In re Mun. Boundaries of City of Southaven, 864 So.2d 912 (Miss. 2003) (judicial estoppel considerations within Miss. context)