Clark v. Edison
881 F. Supp. 2d 192
D. Mass.2012Background
- Civil action for assault and battery arising from alleged childhood sexual abuse by Edison (1974–1977) with memory-recovery claim; plaintiff Timothy Clark sues in diversity in 2008 seeking tolling under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 4C; plaintiff recovered memories in May 2008; three-year statute would apply but discovery rule tolls accrual; substantial evidentiary questions about repressed-memory testimony; court conducted Daubert-based in limine hearings; court denied motions to exclude with limitations; ruling permits both experts to testify on memory repression theory but not on ultimate issues of abuse credibility or memory repression itself; conclusions affect trial readiness and jury guidance.
- Massachusetts discovery rule under ch. 260, § 4C tolls accrual until memory injury discovered and requires reasonable discovery; plaintiff must show actual lack of awareness and objective reasonableness; the case involves potential memory repression rather than mere awareness of abuse.
- Court acknowledged memory-repression theory as highly controversial but admissible under Rule 702 if—subject to 403 limits—reliable and helpful to jury; evidence to be limited, not addressing ultimate issues of whether abuse occurred or memories were repressed.
- Experts Hopper (plaintiff) and Pope (defendant) offered competing views on repression; Chu offered supportive context; court emphasized admissibility should not turn on final credibility of memory but on methodological reliability and relevance.
- Conclusion: both in limine motions denied; Hopper and Pope may testify about memory-repression theory, with strict limitations not to opine on credibility or factual occurrence; evidence of memories recovered in therapy excluded as irrelevant.
- Procedural posture: evidentiary motions decided June 21, 2012; governs trial phase regarding admissibility of specialized memory testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of memory-repression theory under Rule 702 | Memory-repression theory is scientifically testable and widely discussed; discovery rule supports its relevance. | Theory is highly controversial; not generally accepted and lacks verifiable testing. | Admissible under Rule 702 with limits under Rule 403. |
| Whether memory-repression testimony can be used to toll accrual under § 4C | Recovery of memory in 2008 triggers discovery; delay justified by psychological impairment. | Requires stronger empirical support of repression; unreliable to prove tolling. | Remains admissible to inform accrual analysis under § 4C. |
| What limits apply to experts' testimony about repressed memory | Experts may discuss memory processes and recovery; allowed to explain theory's status. | Must not invade ultimate issue of abuse or credibility of memories. | Experts may testify about memory repression theory but cannot testify about plaintiff's credibility or occurrence of abuse. |
| Are Hopper and Pope qualified to give repressed-memory opinions | Both possess relevant experience and scholarship. | Qualifications are insufficient or limited in trauma-memory specifics. | Both are qualified; weight determined on cross-examination. |
| Rule 403 balance for admitting/repress memory evidence | Repressed-memory evidence is probative of discovery-rule timing and context. | Risk of unfair prejudice and confusion; could mislead jurors about credibility. | 403 balancing favors admission with cautionary instructions and limiting instructions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Creighton, 439 Mass. 281 (Mass. 2003) (discovery rule tolls accrual for childhood sexual-abuse claims until awareness of injury and causation)
- Shanley, 455 Mass. 752 (Mass. 2010) (DSM-IV-TR dissociative amnesia as forensic-relevance basis for memory-repression testimony)
- Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467 (Mass. 1996) (objective-reasonableness standard for discovery-rule timing in abuse cases)